Researchers

KIYOTAKI Fumi

KIYOTAKI Fumi: Professor/Assistant Dean

Faculty	Department of Public Management / Graduate School of Economics
Researchmap	https://researchmap.jp/read0194016

Education and Career

Education

- 1994 , Kwansei Gakuin University, Faculty of Economics,
- 1994 , Kwansei Gakuin University, School of Economics,
- 1999 , Kwansei Gakuin University, Graduate School, Division of Economics,
- 1999 , Kwansei Gakuin University, 経済学研究科,

Research Activities

Research Areas

Humanities & social sciences, Theoretical economics

Research Interests

ゲーム理論, 組織の経済学, 契約理論, 人事の経済学, Personnel Economics

Conference Activities & Talks

The opition of sequential alliances for cooperative investments , KIYOTAKI Fumi , European Meeting on Game Theory , 2, Jul. 2019
Do workers negotiate collectively or separately? An application of a coalitional bargaining game with externalities. , KIYOTAKI Fumi , Econometric Society , 22, Aug. 2017

MISC

The Option of Sequential Alliances for Cooperative Investments , Fumi kiyotaki; Toshiji Miyakawa , Kindai Working Papers in Economics , E-48 , Mar. 2024
Barriers to Global Free Trade through Bilateral Agreements , Fumi Kiyotaki; Toshiji Miyakawa , Review of International Economics , 21 , 3 , 536 , 548 , Aug. 2013
Summary:This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a dynamic noncooperative bargaining game with a random proposer. We show that global free trade (a grand coalition) does not necessarily occur unless transfer payments among countries are allowed. When transfer payments are possible, bilateral FTAs always achieve global free trade, but the ex-ante and ex-post inequalities of social welfare among countries are larger than those when all countries are independent because of the strategic bargaining behavior. © 2013 John Wiley &amp Sons Ltd.
The choice of organizational form under intrafirm bargaining rules , Fumi Kiyotaki; Toshiji Miyakawa , JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES , 26 , 3 , 369 , 392 , Sep. 2012
Summary:Kiyotaki, Fumi, and Miyakawa, Toshiji-The choice of organizational form under intrafirm bargaining rules This paper studies the choice of organizational form under incomplete contracts. We identify an organizational form with a rule of ex-post bargaining and compare four types of organization: horizontal organizations, inverted pyramidal hierarchies, pyramidal hierarchies and vertical hierarchies. We show that if the human capital investments of all members are perfectly complementary, the horizontal organization is chosen. If the investments of two players including the owner are essential, the inverted pyramidal hierarchy can occur. Pyramidal hierarchies minimize the agency cost if investments are non-firm-specific. The vertical hierarchy emerges when the owner can motivate a player who undertakes firm-specific investment by assigning him to the middle tier. We also examine who should be assigned to the middle tier in a vertical hierarchy. J. Japanese Int. Economies 26 (3) (2012) 369-392. Faculty of Economics, Kinki University, 3-4-1 Kowakae, Higashiosaka, Osaka 577-8502, Japan; Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, 2-2-8 Osumi, Higashiyodogawa, Osaka 533-8533, Japan. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.