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Faculty of International Studies
Kindai University

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The journal is available online at
<http://int-studies.kindai.ac.jp/curriculum/journal/>

ISSN: 2432-292X (Print)

ISSN: 2432-2938 (Online)

Published in November 2018

by the Faculty of International Studies, Kindai University,

3-4-1 Kowakae, Higashi-Osaka City, 577-8502 Japan

E-mail: journal@intl.kindai.ac.jp

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Printed in Japan by Ryubun Co., Ltd.

Journal of International Studies

Number 3 | 2018

Faculty of International Studies
Kindai University

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因果関係と意味論 Theories of Causation and their Implications to Semantics

濱本 秀樹 (Hideki Hamamoto)*

ABSTRACT: The commonly accepted view on causation is that it brings something about or makes something happen, such as when a stone smashes a window. But how precisely can we grasp what it is for one thing to cause another? There are a number of views on this problem. Some philosophers think the basis of causation is regularity. Others claim that the existence of the effect depends counterfactually on the existence of the cause. Still others argue that causality is defined in such a way that causes raise the probability of their effects. Although we have seen several attempts to provide such an account, it is still safe to say that none has yet succeeded. One can suspect that there is no univocal analysis of the concept of causation. This research, standing on the pluralism of causations, discusses implications of the causal theories to elucidation of semantic features of linguistic constructions, particularly resultative constructions of Japanese and English.

KEYWORDS: 恒常的継起性因果関係理論 (regularity theory of causation)、反実仮想的因果関係論 (counterfactual theory of causation)、確率論的因果関係論 (probabilistic theory of causation)、タイプの因果性 (type causality)、トークンの因果性 (token causality)、結果構文 (resultative constructions)

はじめに

因果関係は世界に満ち溢れている。それがなくては事象を関係づけられないために「因果関係は世界を束ねるセメントである」と哲学者の Hume は述べている。しかしその正確な意味づけ、つまりある出来事 *c* が別の出来事 *e* を CAUSE するとは何を示しているのかという根本問題に関して様々な理論が提唱されてきており、一つの理論に収束していないというのが現状である。むしろ、あまりに多様な因果関係論の共存（競存？）はそのまま世界の多様な因果性の在り方を反映しているのでは

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という解釈さえ唱えられている (Hall 2004、著者もこの立場である)。この小論では第 1 節で因果関係理論を概観する。その際、日本語、英語の結果構文での表現可能性にも言及する。そして第 2 節で因果関係と言語現象、特に意味論、さらに絞れば結果構文といわれる一群のストラクチャーとの関係を整理する。日本語と英語の結果構文では関わる因果性の種類とその程度に違いがあり、これは世界の因果性の多様性を言語構造にどう反映させるのかが言語によって異なることを示しており、言語相対性の一例と言えるかもしれない。第 3 節は議論の総括と今後の展望を述べる。


1. 因果関係諸説の概観

ここでは基礎知識の整理として Hume (1748)に始まる因果関係の恒常的継起性理論、Lewis らが発展させた反実仮想的理論、さらに Reichenbach に始まり、Hitchcock などの研究者によって提唱されている確率論的因果関係説を検討する。これらの諸理論は言語の意味現象と関係づけられることにも言及する。ここで各論に入る前に Psillos (2009) に従い、俯瞰的見解を述べておくにする。それは、出来事 *c* と *e* の間に causality があるとは出来事間に依存性 (dependence) があることまでを前提とする立場 (causation as a relation of dependence) と、2 つの出来事間には必然性や力が介在し、*c* が *e* を CAUSE するとは、結局 *c* が *e* を産出する関係にあること (causation as a productive relation) であるとする見解の 2 つに大別できるとするものである (Psillos 2009:132)。これによれば上記の 3 流派、恒常的継起性理論、反実仮想理論、確率論的理論は、出来事 *c* と *e* の依存性を前提にしていることでは通底していることになる。一方、因果関係を産出的関係とみる流派では、出来事 *c* と *e* の間に何らかの「力」や「継起性を起こす必然性を説明する要因の存在」を想定している。この小論では前者の流派のみ議論の対象として考察する。各因果関係理論に入る前に議論を明確にする道具を説明する。

1.1 ニューロンダイアグラム

因果関係全般についてその関係する要素の相互関係や全体構成を明瞭にする道具として causal graph (因果関係グラフ)、あるいは causal modelling (因果関係モデル) といわれるものが提案されている。ここではその一つである Paul and Hall (2013) で展開されているニューロンダイアグラムを説明道具として使用することにする。下の図 1 が例である。

図 1




円は出来事を示す。(i)では C と E とは独立した別々の出来事であることが示されている。時間は左から右に流れるとする。(ii)では C と E との間に因果的依存性がある場合である。後で詳しく見るのだが因果的依存性は次のように規定される。

(ア) 恒常的継起性理論では C と E の間に「常に接続関係がある」場合、(イ) 反実仮想的因果理論では C と E の間に「反実仮想的依存性 (C が起きなければ E も起きないだろうというもの)」がある場合、(ウ) 確率論的因果関係理論では「C の存在は E の出現確立を C の不存在の場合よりも高める」場合である。これら (ア) (イ) (ウ) のいずれの場合でも、「E は C に因果的に依存する」と考える。この場合に C から E に→が引かれる。矢印は E が C に因果的に依存する、すなわち C が E の原因である (C causes E) ということを表現する。一見すると Langacker らの「ビリヤードモデル」と似ているが根本的に異なるのは出来事間にエネルギーの転移などのプロセスを前提にしていないことである。従って力学的運動による力の移転などは全く考えていない。あくまで C と E に因果的依存性が存在することを示している点に注意を要する。

この見解の優位性をみるために、さらに例を検討しよう。次の状況を考えよう。「健司は目覚ましをセットすることを忘れ目覚ましは鳴らなかった。それで健司は仕事に遅刻した」。この時、健司の遅刻の原因は「目覚ましが鳴らなかったこと」という否定原因 (negative causality) である。本来起きるべきことが起きなかった事は「存在の不存在 (absence of existence)」ということになり、ニューロンダイアグラムでは白い円で表現される。図 2 を見てみよう。

図 2



E と C の間には力の受け渡し等は一切関与していない。E と C の間には因果的依存性があるだけである。このように否定原因でもこの図式は明瞭に事態を捉えることが出来る。

1.2 恒常的継起性理論 (regularity theory of causation)

Hume の因果関係のとらえ方は単純で素朴なものである。「誰かが投げたボールが窓ガラスにあたりそれをバラバラに壊した」という事象を考えてみよう。事象とは一連の出来事で構成されているものとする。出来事 c はボールが窓に向かって飛んでいき、それにあたること、 e は窓ガラスが割れることとする。これはその時、その場所で起こった事象であり token としての 2 つ出来事で構成されている。このような事象は何度も生じ、我々はそれを経験している。そこでボールが窓に向かって飛んでいくことに関してタイプの出来事も想像できる。これを C で示そう。窓ガラスが割れることもタイプとしてとらえられる。それを E で示す。そうすれば c は C の具体的現れであり、 e は E の具体的現れということになる。人が経験から通して得られることは出来事のみである。すべての出来事はバラバラで別のものであるが、一つの出来事が他の出来事に続いて起こる場合、それらの間にいかなるつながり自体は観察できない。2 つの出来事は接続しているが、それぞれは独立別個であって結びついていない。その別々な出来事の継起的、連接的事象が恒常的に起こることが因果関係であるとするのがこの恒常的継起説である (Hume[1748] 2007:170, Mumford and Lill Anjum 2013: 15, Psillos 2009: 131)。この主張を定式化してみよう。

(1) Regularity View of Causation (Psillos 2009:131)

c が e の起因となる (c causes e) となるのは次の場合、そしてその場合に限られる：

- (i) c が時間空間的に e に接続(contiguous) している。
- (ii) e が時間的に c に先行する。
- (iii) C のタイプのすべての出来事は継起的恒常的にタイプ E の出来事に従われる。

例えば、京子がテーブルを拭いてその結果、テーブルがきれいになったという事象があれば、 c が「京子がテーブルを拭いた」であり e は「テーブルはきれいになった」である。 c と e とは時間空間的に接続し、 c が e に先行する。ここまでの(1)の(i)(ii)の段階である。次に、この二つの出来事のタイプとしては主語と行為の対照物を抽象化したものを考える。


(2) (i) $C: \lambda x \lambda y$ [wipe(x, y)]

(ii) $E: \lambda y$ [become -clean(y)]

C は「ある人があるものを拭く抽象的出来事」を示し、 E は「ある対象物がきれいになる抽象的出来事」を表示する。 C は x WIPE y を満たす順序対の集合、 E は

BECOME-CLEAN(y)を満たす y の集合を示し、それぞれタイプを示す。京子のテーブルを拭く出来事 c と、そのテーブルがきれいになる出来事 e とはそれぞれのタイプに帰属するトークンである。タイプ C はタイプ E に恒常的に接続されると考えてよい。つまり誰が任意の対象物を拭いても、その対象物がきれいになるということが継起的に起こると考えられるからである。このため(iii)も充足される。(i)(ii)(iii) の充足により、c は e を起因した、つまり京子のテーブルを拭く動作がテーブルがきれいになるという状態の原因となったことになる。図 3 は「京子がテーブルをきれいに拭いた」状況の恒常的継起性に基づく因果関係を示す。

図 3




ヒュームは言うまでもなくイギリス経験論の完成者であり当然、観察可能な外世界と観念世界とを分けている。恒常的継起性理論は外世界での因果関係を記述するもので、観念世界での物事の捉え方を記述するものではない。恒常的継起性理論を観念世界の表示である言語現象に適応することは Hume の本来の考えにはない。しかし外世界の事象と言語事象は相互に投射関係にあるとしなければ言語は外世界の事態を描写できないし、外世界の事象は伝達されないことになる。故に観察された外部事象が因果関係を持つ場合に言語表現に投影されることは当然と認めてよい。日本語話者が世界での因果関係の成立(図 3)を観察した場合、それを例えば「京子はテーブルをきれいに拭いた」と結果構文を用いて表現する。ここで日本語の結果構文は「主語+目的語+結果状態(形容詞、形容動詞 NI)+他動詞」と規定される。英語でも “Kyoko wiped the table clean” とまったく同様に表現できる。これらの日英表現は外世界の因果事象をそのまま写し取ったものと言える。

ここまでは良い。しかしこの恒常的継起性は何らかの改良をしなければそのままでは因果関係の説明理論としては不十分であることはほぼ定説となっている(Psillos 2009:132)。恒常的継起性を cause とみる見方にはいくつかの反論がある。もっとも有名なものは Reid (1788) によって述べられたものである。Reid は「もし因果関係を 2 つの出来事の恒常的継起性で見做すならば夜は昼の原因となり、昼は夜の原因と言わなくてはならない」と述べた。しかし、昼と夜の推移では真の原因は地球の自転(C)であり、それが「昼になる(E1)」、「夜になる(E2)」を引き起こしているのであるから C causes E1 and E2 と理解すべきである。本来の原因がありそれが 2 つの事象を引き起こしている場合にあたる。これを図示する。E1 と E2 には「見かけ上の恒常的

「継起性」があることに注意。

図 4



恒常的継起性理論にはもっと強力な反例がある。それは「雨男（女）現象」である。ある男（女）が来ると必ず雨になる、それが例外なく起こり、恒常的连接性があるとすれば、2つの事象に必然性がなくても、外世界の現象として因果関係を認めなくてはならなくなる。ヒューム自身も観念世界では原因と結果の間に必然性があることを認めている。しかし外世界で観察される事象には2つの出来事が恒常的に接続するだけであり、必然性は入り込む余地がないと考えている。それならば雨男（あるいは雨女）が雨の原因であることを認めざるを得なくなる。これを避けるためには外世界でも接続関係に偶然以上のものを求めざるをえない。恒常的継起性だけでは外世界の現象の因果関係の実際を捉えることができないのである。この立場を「恒常的継起性+ α 」とする。

恒常的継起性+ α の α に何を置くかにも諸説ある。Millはそれを自然法則と考える。自然法則とは公理と定理で完全に完結するシステムである。Millによれば雨男や雨女が雨をもたらすことは、それが常に起こることであっても、自然法則では規定できず偶発性の範囲を出ることがないということになる。「恒常的継起性+自然法則」が現状では最も有効な恒常的継起理論を守る方策である。このMillの改良版恒常的継起理論を採用すれば「雨男現象」は外世界の因果関係からは外れることになる。

ここで新たな問題が生じる。次の事態とその言語表現を考えよう。健司が花に水をやり、花がペシャンコに倒れた状況を考える。確かに花に水をやることが、花がペシャンコになることの原因と言えそうである。しかし花に水をやる行為が恒常的に花が倒れることと接続するわけではない。水をやることと花が倒れることは自然法則に従っているとしても、それはある質量の水がある形状にある花にあたる場合に引き起こされる状況であり、恒常的であるとは言えない。つまりこの事態は因果関係にないと言わなければならない。日本語話者が外世界で「誰かが花に水をやり、花がペシャンコになった」事実を観察しても、この事態を描写する表現としては「健司が花に水をやって、花はペシャンコになった」というように2つの文を含む複文構造にしなければならず、結果構文を使った「健司は花にペシャンコに水をやった」

は容認されない。一方英語では“Kenji watered the flowers flat”と結果構文で表現できる。いったいこの日本語、英語の違いは何だろうか。これは両言語の外世界と観念世界の投射関係の違いとして説明できる。

日本語では外世界での恒常的継起理論による因果関係が成立する事態のみを、観念世界においても因果関係を反映した結果構文で描写できるのに対し、英語では恒常的継起理論による因果関係の認定の場合以外の「恒常性を欠いている因果関係の事態」も結果構文で表現できるということになる。それでは英語世界の外界解釈では恒常的継起理論以外にどのような因果関係を認めるだろうか。それを次に見ることになろう。

1.3 反実仮想的因果関係理論

Hume の因果関係理論をもう一度みてみよう。

We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.
(Hume 1748, Section XII)

原因とは他の対象に追従される対象でありそこでは最初の対象に似たすべての対象は第二の対象に似たものに追従されるのである。別の言い方をすればもし最初の対象が存在しなければ第二の対象は決して存在しなかったといえるのである。

彼の主張の前半部分はすでに見た恒常的継起説について述べている。Hume の主張の後半部分は「反実仮想的因果関係説」の端緒になるものである。しかしその当時は反実仮想の真理条件がはっきりしていなかったのも、ほとんどの経験主義論者は因果関係を反実仮想で説明することに価値があるとは考えていなかった。しかし後年 Lewis (1973)は反実仮想の真理条件を可能世界意味論の考え方を採用することで精密化することに成功した。彼の反実仮想に基づく因果関係の基本定義は次のようである。

- (3) 反実仮想文 $A \Box \rightarrow B$ (もし A ならば B だろう) は真になるのは
- (i) A が成立する可能世界が存在しない場合 (vacuously true 空の真)、あるいは
 - (ii) B が成立するある A 世界が、B が成立しないどのような A 世界よりも現実の世界に近い(似ている)場合、そしてその場合に限られる。

(3i) は条件文の前件が偽の場合、条件文全体が真になるという規定に基づいている。これは空の真と考えてよい。本当に問題になるのは (3ii) の規定であり、反実仮想文が真になるのは、前件が成立し、かつ後件も成立するような可能世界が、後件は成立しないが前件が成立するどのような可能世界よりも現実世界に近い（似ている）場合である、と規定している。また Lewis はある出来事が別の出来事の原因になる、つまり原因 (cause) と結果 (effect) の関係にあることを「因果的に依存する」と捉え次の規定(4)を置いている。

(4) 現実に出現した2つの出来事 e と c があってそれを含む命題をそれぞれ C と E とする場合、出来事 e と c で、 e が c に因果的に依存する (e depends causally on c) のは次の反実仮想文が成立する場合に限られる。

- a. $C \Box \rightarrow E$ “if c were to occur, then e would occur”
 b. $\sim C \Box \rightarrow \sim E$ “If c hadn’t occurred, then e wouldn’t have occurred”
 (Lewis 1973:563)


これは出来事 c と e 、それらを表現する命題を C と E としたとき（ここでは C と E はタイプを表示していない点に注意）、命題 C と E に (4a、b) の反実仮想文が成立した場合に出来事 e は出来事 c に「因果的に依存する」、つまり「 c は原因であり e はその結果である」ことになる。

具体的な例を見てみよう (Mumford and Lill Anjum 2013:51 から)。「線路にヘラジカがいた」という事象と「列車が遅れた」という事象が接続して生じたとする。線路にヘラジカがいたことが原因で列車が遅れたという結果をもたらしたと言えるためには、まず(4a)の条件「ヘラジカが線路にいること」と「列車が遅れたこと」が真である必要がある。これは現実には起こっている場合には自動的に充足される。もう少し説明しよう。 $C \Box \rightarrow E$ が真になるためには E が成立し、かつ C が成立する可能世界が、 E が成立しないが C が成立するどのような可能世界よりも現実に近い場合である。しかし現実世界では E 、 C とともに成立しているのだから、 E が成立し、かつ C が成立する可能世界は現実そのものということになり $C \Box \rightarrow E$ は成立していることになる。

さらに(4b)の条件「もしヘラジカが線路にいなかったら列車は遅れなかっただろうに」と言えることが必要である。 $\sim C \Box \rightarrow \sim E$ が真になるには $\sim E$ が成立する $\sim C$ 世界（ヘラジカが線路に現れず列車が遅れなかった世界）が、 E が成立する $\sim C$ 世界（ヘラジカが現れなかったのに列車が遅れた世界）よりも現実世界から乖離が少ない場合に限られる。そしてこれは真であると判断してよい。以上のような状況が外世界

で起こった場合、反実仮想的因果関係論では、以上から「列車が遅れたこと」は因果的に「線路にヘラジカがいたこと」に依存すると言えるのである（注意 このヘラジカの状況は恒常的継起性理論でも因果関係を認めることができる。トークンの事態だけではなく、ヘラジカが線路に踏み込めば、列車が立ち往生し遅れる、というタイプの理解も当然可能だからである）。この状況を図示してみよう。

図 5



それでは第 1 節で取り上げた問題となる例を考えてみよう。それは「健司が花に水をやって花はペシャンコに倒れた」という事態である。この事態は「もし健司が花に水をやらなければ花はペシャンコにならなかった」と言えるので「花がペシャンコになった」は「健司が花にみずをやった」ことに反実仮想的に依存する。つまり「健司が花に水をやった」ことは「花がペシャンコになった」ことの原因(cause)と言えるのである。英語では反実仮想条件的な因果関係でも“Kenji watered the flowers flat”と結果構文で表現できるのに対し、日本語では結果構文「健司は花にペシャンコに水をやった」は容認されない。「健司は花に水をやって花はペシャンコになった」というように「動詞+て」を持つ複文で表現するか、あるいは「健司は花がペシャンコになるほど水をやった」のように「～するほど」という結果程度を示す表現を使う。あるいは cause を明示した使役的結果構文「健司は花に水をやりペシャンコにした」ともいえる。「花に水をやる」と「花がペシャンコになる」とには恒常的连接性がない。誰かが花に水をやれば花はペシャンコに倒れるという事態が常に起こるわけではなく、この「健司の水まきのケース」にたまたま起きたことであって、タイプの的に抽象化できない。このような場合、日本語では「目的語+結果状態+動詞」という結果構文は使えず、2 つの出来事間の因果関係を明示的に示す複文構造を使って表現する。


結局、英語では外世界で反実仮想的に捉えた因果関係が成立すれば、それを観念世界で結果構文として表現できるのに対し、日本語では恒常的継起性により解釈できる外世界の因果関係のみが通常の結果構文で表現できることになる。

さらにもう一例考えてみよう。外世界の事態として、「健司は咳がひどくて出血した」というものを考えよう。この事態では確かに、「健司が咳をすることが出血につながった」という解釈が可能である。「健司が咳をする」と「健司が出血した」

こととの間に何らかの因果関係が存在するようにも感じられる。この因果関係の存在はどのように捉えることが出来るのだろうか。恒常的継起性説、あるいは反実仮想的因果理論で捉えることが出来るのだろうか。

まず、恒常的継起的因果理論では、その条件の(iii),すなわち、「C のタイプのすべての出来事は継起的恒常的にタイプ E の出来事に従われる」を充足できない。「咳をすること」と「出血する」の間に「恒常的连接性」が成立することはあり得ない。我々は「雨男」の例を考慮し、「恒常的连接性+ α 」を考え、 α に自然法則を想定している。C と E との間に自然法則としての连接性が認められねばならないと考えれば、上述の出来事間に自然法則的恒常的连接性を認めることはできない。それでは反実仮想的因果関係理論ではどうであろうか。これは「もし C が起こらなければ E が起こらなかった」と言えれば E は C に反実仮想的に依存し、したがって C causes E と判断できるということである。ここで本当に「咳をしなければ健司は出血しなかった」と言えるのだろうか。もちろん咳がひどくて喉の血管から多少出血することもあり得るだろう。しかし隠れた原因がある場合がある。その場合には反実仮想的依存性は想定できない。つまり咳をする事が出血の原因ではないことになる。これを図示してみよう。

図 6



C: 健司は肺結核を患っている、A: 健司が咳をした、C: 健司が出血した

矢印は因果関係の成立を示す。健司は肺結核を患っておりそれが健司を出血させたのである。これが隠れた原因である。C は A だけではなく B も引き起こした。しかし A が時間的に先行した。そのため A が B の原因のように捉えられた。これを仮に点線の矢印で示そう。外世界では、「C が起こらなければ B が起こらなかっただろう」ということは事実であるが、「A が起きなければ B が起きなかった」という事は成立しない。しかし一応 A と B の間に連鎖を想定できれば A は B の原因と、事実ではなく観念上捉えられるだろう。しかしここで問題が出てくる。反実仮想因果論も外世界の因果関係理論であり、観念的構築物を入れることはできない。つまり反実仮想的因果理論ではこのような観念的な因果関係を想定し、因果関係の構築することは許されない。ここで客観的事実としては 2 通り可能である。本当に咳がひどく、他の原因はなく、咳が出血の原因である場合、それから上述の隠れた原因がある場合である。このような状況を観察して日本語話者であれば「健司は咳をして出

血した」と複文構造で表現することは可能である。しかし恒常的継起性は充足しないので単文の結果構文では表現できない。一方英語ではどうなるだろうか。“Kenjii coughed himself into hemorrhage”というように立派に結果構文で表現できる。そうすると少なくとも英語圏ではこのような（隠れた原因があるかもしれない）事態でも何らかの因果関係の捉え方があり、それを結果構文で表現できるということになる。その因果関係の捉え方は恒常的継起性理論や反実仮想因果関係理論とは異なるものである。それを次節でみよう。

1.4 確率論的因果関係理論

Hitchcock(2004)の説明に従って確率論的因果関係理論を簡単にみてみよう。アイデアは非常に簡単である。次の条件付き確立を使った定式を見られたい。

$$(5) C \text{ causes } E \text{ iff } P(E/C) > P(E/\sim C)$$

これはCということが起きない状況でEが起こる確率よりも、Cが起きた状況でのEが起こる確率が高い、そのときに限ってCはEの原因である、という規定である。Cが起きた時に100%の確率でEも起きるということではなく、Cが起きない状況よりもEの出現確率が高まればEとCの間に確率的依存関係が成立するという意味である。先刻の「健司の咳」の例によく似た例を考えよう。咳をする人は肺結核に罹っている確率は咳をしない人よりは高いことは事実として確かめられている。しかしそこから「咳をすることは結核の原因である」とは言えない。あることCがEの原因であるためには、確率を比較する集団で、条件C以外は全く差がない、唯一の違いがCであるという状況が必要である。そのためC以外の背景条件Bを設定し、それを追加的条件に追加した式が(6)である。

$$(6) C \text{ causes } E \text{ iff } P(E/C \text{ and } B) > P(E/\sim C \text{ and } B)$$

上記の式ではC以外の条件は全てBで表現され、それは2つの集団で均一であることが保証されている。つまり、2つの集団での属性の違いは条件Cが存在するかどうかだけということになる。従って、条件Cの存在下でEの確率が上がれば、それは明らかにC causes E、つまり事象Cが事象Eの原因となると言ってよいことになる。

先にみた「健司は咳をして出血した」状況、つまり(i)本当に出血が唯一の可能な原因である場合、(ii)隠れた原因がある場合、の二義性を持つ場合においてどちらの定式が相応しい因果関係把握の方式であるかを検討しよう。先ず(5)と(6)どちらも確率を扱う以上、人の集団間での属性比較であって、個人の属性の比較ではない。つ

まり確率的因果関係説はトークンレベルではなくタイプレベルでの確率的依存性を想定したものである。従って確率論的因果関係をトークンの事態に適用するには、タイプレベルでの確率的因果関係の知識が世界知識（一般的な事柄全般の知識）に含まれ、それが一連の推論に利用されたと考える必要がある。推論は次のように構成される。

- (7) (i) 健司が咳をしている、やがて出血した（観察事実）
- (ii) 咳をする人は咳をしない人より出血する確率が高い（一般的知識）
- (iii) 故に、健司の出血は咳が原因である（結論）

確率論的因果関係のトークンレベルの適用は、一般的知識を介在した推論の形式をとるということである。その際、(7ii)で採用される一般的知識は(5)か(6)のどちらが選択されるだろうか。もちろん(5)である。もし(6)を採用すれば咳をすること以外は全く共通の2集団比較になり、そこで出血する確率が高ければ、咳をすることが唯一可能な出血の原因になるからである。一方(5)を採用すれば他の原因の可能性を排除せず、「咳をする人の多くが出血する傾向を持つ」という傾向(propensity)を取り入れた推論であり、現実によりよく適合する。注意すべきことは確率的因果論で傾向性を議論の中に組み込めば、それはもはや客観的な外世界の描写ではなく、人の持つ思考傾向、つまり観念世界の記述になるということである。そして英語世界ではこのような傾向的な確率的依存性（＝主観確率的依存性）をも結果構文で表現できるということになる。一方、日本語世界ではこのような主観確率依存性を正当な原因—結果関係とは認めない。

2. 結果構文の意味論

この節では前節での因果関係理論と意味論的結びつきを結果構文に焦点をあて整理してみたい。まず日本語の出来事間の因果的依存性を表現する方式を確認し、それを英語の場合と比較する。

2.1 日本語と英語の因果的依存性の意味論

日本語ではある出来事と別の出来事に因果的依存性がある場合、「京子は花瓶を粉々に割った」、「俊江はテーブルをきれいに拭いた」のような結果構文を使う。前節の分析で見たように、この結果構文は「恒常的継起性」による因果的依存性がある場合にのみ使用可能で、反実仮想的因果依存性、確率論的因果依存性が認められてもその状況を結果構文では表現できない。そのような場合には「健司は花に水を

やって花はペシャンコになった」、「健司は咳をして出血した」というように、「・・・動詞1+て+・・・動詞2」のように出来事間の時間推移を示す「て」を利用し（cf. 夕食を食べて寝る：食べる>寝る）出来事間の時間順序を示すことで因果関係を間接的に示す。あるいは「京子は健司を殴って気絶させた」のように「する、させる」という使役表現を使って直接的に表現する。いずれにせよ、恒常的継起性による因果依存性の場合以外には複文を使う。英語では以上のいずれのケースも単文の結果構文で表現可能である。下にまとめてみる。

(8) (i) 恒常的継起性因果依存

- (a) 京子は花瓶を粉々に割った。

Kyoko broke the vase into pieces.

- (b) 京子はテーブルをきれいに拭いた。

Kyoko wiped the table clean.

- (c) その刀鍛冶は真っ赤な鋼を平らに打った。

The sword smith hammered the red-hot steel flat.

(ii) 反実仮想的因果依存

- (a) 健司は花に水をやって花をペシャンコにした。

Kenji watered the flowers flat.

- (b) 京子は健司をゆすって健司は目が覚めた。

Kyoko shook Kenji wake.

- (c) 京子は健司を殴って健司は気絶した。

Kyoko knocked Kenji senseless.

(iii) 確率論的因果依存

- (a) 健司は咳いて出血した。

Kenji coughed himself into hemorrhage.

- (b) 京子はブラシが粉々になるほど、絵を描いた。

Kyoko painted the brush into pieces.

- (c) そのヒーラーは話しかけるだけで健司の手から7つイボをとった。


The healer talked his seven warts off from Kenji's hands.

以上の例をよく観察すると、恒常的継起性による因果依存の例は全て反実仮想による因果依存性も併せ持つように思われる。例えば、京子がテーブルを拭かなければテーブルはきれいにならなかっただろうし、刀鍛冶が焼けた鋼を打たなければ鋼は平らにならなかったといえるだろう。つまり恒常的継起性による因果関係は反実仮想的因果関係を論理含意（*entail*）すると考えられるわけである。つまり意味関係

でいえば、恒常的継起性に基づく因果関係の方が反実仮想的因果関係よりも強いことになる。一方、確率論的因果依存性に基づく結果構文も依存性を因果関係の基本に置いていることは共通するものの、他の因果関係とは含意関係はないように思える。先述のように確率論的因果関係はタイプの、傾向的因果関係に基づくもので、他の因果関係はトークンの因果関係（継起的依存性は条件としてタイプの条件の充足を要求するが）に基づくのであるから意味論的には幾分異質な感じがする。以上を図示してみよう。

図 7

因果関係空間での意味論的位置関係



R: Regularity view of causation
 C: Counterfactual view of causation
 P: Probability view of causation
 D: Dependence theories of causation

中核に来る R は恒常的継起性に基づく因果関係の捉え方であり、その外には反実仮想的因果関係 C が来る。それに少し離れて確率論的因果関係 P が配置されるがこれらは全て因果関係を依存性と捉えているので D カテゴリーに包摂される。その他の空間はこの小論で述べなかった causation as a productive relation と一括して理解できる因果関係の捉え方に対応する。

2.2 結果構文の統語論

ここで少し統語論的に考察しよう。日本語と英語との比較においてよく言われることは、日本語は動詞フレーム言語、英語はサテライトフレーム言語というものである。

(9) (a) 健司はベッドから床に転がり出た。

(b) John rolled out of his bed onto the floor.

経路と移動の様態で構成される移動動詞の場合、日本語では移動の経路を動詞そのもので示し（転がり出た）、様態は補助的に示す（転がり出た）。英語では様態を主動詞が示し（rolled）、移動経路は前置詞句で示される（out of his bed onto the floor）というものである。

この考え方を結果構文の分析にもあてはめてみよう。日本語と英語の短文で表現する結果構文は下の例で見るように語句の配置こそ鏡像的になるが基本的に同一構造である。つまり強い因果関係を表現するには日英ともシンプルな他動詞型の結果構文を採用していることになる。このような構造を持つ結果構文を Wechesler (2005)では Control 型結果構文と呼んでいる。

(10) (a) 京子はテーブルをきれいに拭いた。

(b) Kyoko wiped the table clean.

結果状態を到達点とし、動詞はその到達点に至る様態を含むので、構文全体としては（他動詞 *wipe* 自動詞 *roll* の違いはあるが）日英表現ともに(9b)に近似したサテライトフレーム型になっている。しかしこの因果関係の中核から離れると様子が変わってくる。次の例を考えてみよう。

(11) (a) 京子は花に水をやってぺシャンコにした。

(b) Carol watered the flowers flat.

この恒常的継起性では捉えられず、反実仮想的因果関係を表現する場合、日本語では複文で表現する(→11a)。この時、時間的順序を規定する「て」を使い、因果性につきものの原因の先行性を表示している。一方英語では他動詞型の結果構文の形式に固執している(→11b)。英語では最後尾にくる結果状態は到達点の解釈が可能であるから 2 つの出来事の時間順序を明示する必要がない。これは英語は基本的にサテライトフレーム型言語であることに起因する。

さらに中核から離れた場合の例である(12)をみてみよう。

(12) (a) 健司は咳いて出血した。

(b) Kenji coughed himself into hemorrhage.

日本語では「出血する」を自動詞とし、それに至る様態「咳いて」は補助的な扱いになっている。一方、英語では他動詞型結果構文への固執がさらに顕著になり、自動詞 *cough* に見かけ上の目的語 *himself* を置き、至りつく経路の終点である結果状態は最後尾に前置詞句 *into hemorrhage* で表現している。Wechesler(2005)はこのような下位範疇化しない要素を持つ英語の結果構文を ECM 型と呼んで、先の Control 型と区別している。結局、英語でも因果関係において中核から周辺にいたる状況を表現する場合に恒常的継起性因果関係の場合と反実仮想的因果関係までは Control 型で表現

し、周辺の因果関係である確率論的因果性についてはかなり変則的な ECM 型結果構文になっている。以上のことは、英語の他動詞型結果構文への固執性が関与していると言って間違いない。

3. 総括

この小論では 2 つの出来事間に依存性があることを因果関係と見做す理論 (causation as a relation of dependence) の代表として恒常的継起性因果関係説、反実仮想的因果関係説、確率論的因果関係説を確認した。またそれが意味論的にどのような関りがあるのかを結果構文を中心に検討した。意味論は人の観念世界を表現する言語を意味の点から構成する部門である。人をとりまく世界では様々な現象が起こる。出来事と出来事に因果関係が存在する場合、どのような事象が起こっていればそれを因果関係の成立と見做すのかは存在論の領域である。因果関係の存在論的理解 (外世界の理解) が意味論的な因果関係の解釈 (観念世界の理解) の背後にあるのは当然であるが今までこのような観点からは全く議論されてこなかった。この小論に独自性、学術的貢献があるとすればこの問題を初めて議論したことに尽きるだろう。

本論文の結論として、日本語の結果構文は恒常的継起性依存による因果関係のみを表現する言語手段になっていること、英語は恒常的継起性以外の反実仮想的依存性、確率的依存性に基づく因果関係をも表現できる手段となっているということが明らかになった。このことは、認識の点では日本語話者も英語話者も、同じような知覚経験には同じような観念を生じたとしても、言語手段が異なるので表現方法の違いとなって表出されると考えられる。日本語話者も反実仮想的依存性、確率的依存性に基づく因果関係を当然認識できるが、それを単文の結果構文には投射できず、複文を使った表現法をとるということである。言語圏で思考が同一であったとしても言語表現がたまたま異なるとするのである。これが普通の見方であろう。

しかし、ここで言語の違いを思考へと逆に投射してみよう。英語話者では Control 型、ECM 型と統語構造上は異なった形態をとるものの、他動詞型構造 (self を含む疑似他動詞型構造を含む) で因果関係の諸事象を一括的に表現できるということを考えてみれば、日本語話者では因果関係と捉えられていない事象をも、英語話者には因果関係的に理解している証拠とも解釈できる。極端に言えば、日本語話者には正当な因果関係に思えない事象でも、英語話者ならば因果性を認めてしまうということなのかもしれない。これはつまり言語相対性の一つの証拠なのかもしれないということである。この点は非常に興味深いがさらに議論を深めなければならない。

また生産的因果関係理論 (causation as a productive relation) については全く議論し

なかった。この因果関係理論も意味論的な分析に何らかの関りがあると思えるが、それは今後の研究課題とする。

*本研究は文部科学省科学研究費（基盤研究(C)課題番号 17K02911 2017 年度～2019 年度「意味と身体化に基づく英語教授法の提案」研究代表者 濱本秀樹）の研究成果の一部である。

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Suspending Logic: A Linguistic Exercise. Part I - Dimensions and Levels of Analysis, with Some Contrastive Considerations

Emma Tămăianu-Morita*

ABSTRACT: Japanese is sometimes described as more ‘illogical’, or at least more ‘vague’, from the standpoint of the referential function, than English and other European languages. In counterpoise, fostering the students’ logical thinking abilities is often put forward as one of the educational goals of teaching English in Japan. This paper examines critically some of the ground tenets that underlie these two complementary views, adopting a contrastive perspective, with illustrations selected mainly from Japanese, English and Romanian texts. Starting from a distinction proposed by E. Coseriu (1957) between two radically different acceptations of «logic» in relation to language, the present paper explores the functional autonomy of the judgments of idiomatic correctness and textual adequacy (appropriateness) from the judgments of congruence and logical coherence, in light of a general principle of suspendability of non-conformity evaluations from more specific levels to more general levels of language organization and linguistic competence. Part I focuses on instances where the judgments of incongruence are suspended through the semantic organization of particular languages as historically-constituted traditions of speech.

KEYWORDS: Linguistic conceptualization, Textual meaning, Congruence, Correctness, Adequacy (Appropriateness)

Introduction

Let us consider the following four verbal sequences. The reader is invited to judge which case(s) contain(s) elements that call for suspending the requirements of logical reasoning in order to accept the respective sequence(s) as (a fragment of) text/discourse.

- (1) On the 11th of May 2013 I took a day trip by bus from Almería to Córdoba, in order to see the spectacular Festival of the *Patios*.

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- (2) ネコのクロちゃんはネズミを見ると怖がる。¹
- (3) [Roshi:] – How is the koan coming?
 [Acolyte:] – There is no koan.
 [Roshi:] – How is that?
 [Acolyte:] – There is no koan, and which one is unimportant.
- (4) Professor: [...] Thus all words in all languages...
 Pupil: Oh yes? ... I've got toothache.
 Professor: We go on... are always the same, as are all flexional endings, all prefixes, all suffixes, all roots...
 Pupil: Are the roots of words square roots?
 Professor: Square or cubic. It depends.
 Pupil: I've got toothache.

Perhaps most readers will characterize (1) as demanding no suspension of logic whatsoever. In the case of (2), a minor note would be made that the facts described are somewhat surprising, in the sense that our previous (“encyclopaedic”) knowledge concerning the behaviour of cats leads us to expect that cats, as fierce hunters, should not be afraid of mice. On the other hand, (3) would be shown to contain a blatant logical contradiction in the last turn: the expression “which one” presupposes a set of (existing) *kōans* (公案) out of which one is picked up, but such a selection cannot be operated out of *non-existing* *kōans*. Finally, (4) would perhaps strike the reader as incoherent in its entirety: the thematic development is erratic (‘languages’ → ‘toothache’ → ‘languages’ (morphology) → ‘mathematics’ → ‘toothache’); the referential content is preposterous (all the words in all languages are the same); the context which should serve to disambiguate the lexical meaning of “root” shifts freely from grammar to mathematics and back to grammar, or, more precisely, constitutes a single undifferentiated context engulfing both without distinction.

Such an evaluation would seem to be supported by the typological nature of the texts. Sequences (1) and (2) are fragments of personal accounts: original formulations which stem from the author’s own experience. Sequence (3) is excerpted from a short story entitled *The Koan* by Donald Richie (1991: 27)², which is part of a collection of Zen-inspired “stories, fables, parables and sermons”³. Sequence (4) is

¹ *Neko no Kuro-chan wa nezumi wo miru to kowagaru* (approx. “Kuro the cat is afraid of mice.”)

² The fragment is quoted with the original spelling, which does not mark the long vowels of *rōshi* (Zen master) and *kōan* (the insoluble paradox used in Zen training in order to break down and ultimately annul the ordinary patterns of thought and experience).

³ The same procedure can be found in the *Preface* to the volume: “[...] I know little about Zen. My theoretical knowledge is scattered; my understanding, based upon emotional hankering, cannot be said to exist; and having had no real experience, I can have no real comprehension. [...] Since, however, I am presenting my lack of credentials, I should add in all fairness that *the training that I did not have was of the best*. Though I cannot say that I studied with Daisetsu

excerpted from Eugène Ionesco's now classical piece of absurd theater "La leçon" ("The Lesson" [1954/ 2000: 203]).

Yet, the answer sketched above, for all its appearance of credibility, is wrong.

Let us then disclose the correct answer from the very beginning: **all** four sequences call for a suspension of logical reasoning in order to function as (fragments of) text/discourse. The difference is not quantitative (as the scalar description above may suggest), but qualitative – one that concerns what kind of 'logical' component is suspended, and at what level of linguistic organization that hermeneutic process occurs. This contribution aims at justifying this claim and suggesting some conceptual distinctions that may prove useful not only in the domain of linguistic text analysis and interpretation as a goal in itself, but also in the practical field of teaching/learning a foreign language and its associated discourse.

Due to space limitations, the discussion will be organized in two parts. The present article (Part I) introduces the topic and justifies its significance, outlines the theoretical background, illustrates some fundamental distinctions that need to be operated (two radically different acceptations of 'Logic' in relation to language, and the principle of 'suspendability' of non-conformity evaluations) and then analyzes in detail the first two fragments proposed for reflection in the Introduction, which represent cases of suspension of 'Logic' on the level of the semantic organization of particular languages as historically-constituted traditions of speech. A future article, representing Part II of the contribution, will deal with the third and fourth textual examples, which constitute more complex cases, of suspension of 'Logic' on the level of discourse understood as a functionally autonomous level where the processes of sense-construction unfold⁴. On this level, the strategies of suspending 'Logic' are motivated by each text's unique overall signifying intention and typological orientation. Consequently, the analysis and interpretation will have a very different focus and domain of applicability than the analysis of the first two sample texts.

1. Rationale

1.1. Can a language be less 'logical' than another?

The idea of the present contribution arose from the author's long-term preoccupation with the contrastive study of languages, English and Japanese among them. Japanese is often described as more 'illogical', or at least more 'vague', from the standpoint of the referential function, than English and other European languages. In counterpoise, "fostering the students' logical thinking abilities (論理的思考力)" is often put forward as one of the educational goals of teaching English in Japan.

A well-known theoretical proposal attempts to clarify and, ultimately, substantiate the former intuitive judgement. Thus, Yoshihiko Ikegami (1981) proposes the typological dichotomy «DO-language vs. BECOME-language» with

Suzuki, I did meet and talk with him every week or so over the years 1947 and 1948 while he was living at Engaku-ji." (1991: viii; emphasis mine – E.T.-M.)

⁴ This conceptual framework is presented and discussed in detail in Tămăianu-Morita (2016).

English and Japanese respectively as prototypical instantiations of the two poles, and then expands the opposing types of linguistic organization into a more encompassing model of contrasting semiotic orientations in language and culture, where the cultures associated with the two languages are also held to illustrate orientations towards a “maximally clear semiotic articulation” vs. a “blurred semiotic articulation” (1988-1989, 1989, 1998). In this model, Japanese appears as “relatively underdetermined in its referential function”, but “relatively specific in its interpersonal function” (Ikegami 1998: 1901, 1996), and these characteristics are also found in other manifestations of (traditional) Japanese culture, when examined in contrast to “Western” culture:

One can find certain features recurring across different areas of Japanese culture. Such features are the focus on complementarity (rather than a focus on contrast), subject-object fusion (rather than subject-object opposition) and the metonymic orientation either in terms of focus on the concrete (rather than focus on the abstract) or in terms of focus on the small (rather than focus on the large). One has the impression that all these features in culture are prototypically found in the way in which the Japanese language functions. (Ikegami 1998: 1909)

A summary of the contrasting features that delineate the two poles is given in Table 1⁵.

Table 1. Ikegami’s model of contrasting semiotic orientations in language

Maximally clear semiotic articulation ≡ DO-language (ex. English)	Minimally clear (blurred) semiotic articulation ≡ BECOME-language (ex. Japanese)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Orientation towards discreteness (focus on an individuum – <i>mono</i>, ‘thing’) ▪ Focus on contrast ▪ Representation of movement as a change in locus Motion: goal-oriented ▪ Agent highlighted in the scene (higher agentivity) ▪ Subject – object opposition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Orientation towards non-discreteness (focus on the continuum, on the event as a whole, with individuals submerged in the whole – <i>koto</i>, ‘fact’) ▪ Focus on complementarity ▪ Representation of movement as a change in state, or transition Transition: process-oriented ▪ Agent assimilated in the scene (lower agentivity, de-agentivization of the agent, total effacement of the agent) ▪ Subject – object fusion

⁵ For an extensive critical discussion of this model, see Tămăianu-Morita (2006).

Ikegami's model and the overall semantic and cognitive tendencies it intends to capture have a great deal of intuitive appeal to both specialists and non-specialists – speakers and learners of the two languages, especially to those who come from a Western background and are faced with the remarkable difficulties and intricacies of Japanese. It may be that the lay perception has been responsible for the emergence of the image of Japanese as less 'logical', by equating 'vagueness' in linguistic *Gestaltung* and the higher context-dependency of Japanese with a lack of 'clarity', in turn equated with a lack of 'logic', or in any case a looser application of 'logic'.

To take a well-known and much discussed example, in Japanese it is possible to combine expressions of approximation with the smallest quantum of plurality, and declare that you need not two objects, but about/around two, as in “ふたつほどください” (“*futatsu hodo kudasai*”), whereas in English the contradiction between the absolute precision of a number as small as 2 and the notion of approximation makes a corresponding formulation very unnatural: “I'll have about two”. Naturally (i.e. as is to be expected from a 'logical' point of view), the higher the number, the easier it becomes to form acceptable combinations. Some English speakers may already feel that “I'll have about three” sounds 'natural'; from four to ten the judgments of acceptability would probably be unanimous, as they would be from ten upwards as well, provided that the numbers themselves are not 'too' exact. For example, “about 150” presents no problem, but an impression of contradiction may arise again in the case of, say, “about 153”). In the light of such an example, one feels indeed inclined to accept that the Japanese semantic organization is 'vague' or in any case allows for more 'vagueness' than its English counterpart. To this, a speaker of Romanian may counterargue: Romanian evidences a “maximally clear” semiotic articulation in its lexical and grammatical organization, inherited from Latin, and yet it is perfectly possible and natural to ask for “about two” objects, as in “Dați-mi *vreo două*”, where *vreo* is an indeterminate adverb of approximation quite similar in many contexts of usage with the Japanese *hodo* (ほど). Does this suggest that in lexis and grammar Romanian is closer to the pole of English, but in usage, discourse, and possibly also as regards the associated cultural tendencies it is closer to the pole of Japanese? Attractive as this may sound as a would-be illustration of mental and cultural sistership beyond spatial and linguistic frontiers, obviously a claim formulated in these terms has no objective basis at all.

In reality, what examples such as this one show is simply that the model of contrasting semiotic orientations does not apply uniformly to a language, the discourse constructed in that language, and the culture in which the language is embedded, and neither do the judgments of 'vagueness' vs. 'clarity' or 'logical' vs. 'illogical'.

In the system of the language, each key unit from the examples above (*futatsu*, *hodo*, *two*, *about*, *două*, *vreo*) is perfectly clear and displays the maximally tight type of articulation that exists in the domain of verbal expression: each has a significatum defined oppositively within paradigmatic structures and possesses well-established combinatorial valencies in syntagmatic structures, and as linguistic concepts they are not – indeed *cannot* – be 'vague' at all. As significata-in-use, i.e. as acceptations actualized in the given combinations, they are also perfectly clear, and

still defined rather tightly (perhaps not always oppositively, but by clearly recognizable differences in meaning). Adding the unit of approximation *hodo*, *about* or *vreo* signals that the speaker does not attach importance to the number itself, but to getting *some* objects as opposed to *no* objects at all: « Even one *might* do, but I'll have two (or three) just in case », « I may need two after all » – which is what a speaker of English could naturally say, if he/she actually wanted to convey the same communicative intention as through the Japanese “*futatsu hodo kudasai*”. The issue of ‘vagueness’ vs. ‘clarity’, with all the degrees in between, does not relate to the system of the (three) languages and the significata of the respective expressions, but to the ulterior operation of designating a certain state of things in a concrete discourse act. It is this designation that can be presented as ‘clear’ or ‘unclear’, ‘precise’ or ‘imprecise’, ‘vague’ or ‘exactly delimited’ etc. In principle, any such type of designation is possible through any language, by choosing different means of expression from different functional levels of linguistic organization. In other words, the semantic and typological characteristics (or, to use Ikegami’s term, the “semiotic orientation”) of a text are functionally autonomous from the nature and typological characteristics of the system and norm(s) of the language(s) in which the text is constructed⁶.

1.2. Discussion

A confusion of levels seems to motivate the use of this example for substantiating the “vague” character of Japanese. For instance, Ikegami (1995: 11) indicates that “the Japanese speaker prefers to avoid an exact delimitation either of quantity or of quality, saying something like «approximately two» (instead of simply and clearly

⁶ In Tămăianu-Morita (2006), a detailed textual analysis shows how the units of a very precisely articulated language (Romanian) can be used to create referential vagueness (indeterminacy) in the construction of the textual world and the construal of textual meaning. Ikegami (1995: 12) also admits the lack of a deterministic correlation between “the overall characteristic of the grammar of a language” and what he calls “the general characteristic of the linguistic performance of the speakers of the same language”, attributing this lack to contingent factors, such as the unpredictability of the speakers’ choices in concrete situations or “competing motivations” which lead to different choices by speakers of languages with the same characteristics. His conclusion is formulated in rather noncommittal terms: “there is nothing which prevents the speakers of a «vague» language from *trying* to speak in an unvague way” (emphasis mine – E.T.-M.). The stance advocated by us differs in essence from Ikegami’s position: we hold that the non-correlation is one of principle, arising from the double semiotic relation in discourse, i.e. from the fact that the units of a language, with their content and expression and all their characteristics and relations within the language, function as semiotic expression for a higher-degree content, which is textual sense, created according to specific strategies and mechanisms. Secondly, though no less importantly, it is doubtful that one and the same “overall characteristic”, as far as “vagueness” is concerned, can be found to reign over the whole system of a language. Finally, it is clearly false that there is any such thing as a “general characteristic of the linguistic performance of the speakers” of a language: in the domain of discourse, general orientations of the sense-construction processes vary significantly according to text-typological and contextual factors that *can* and often *do* apply cross-linguistically and cross-culturally.

saying «two») or saying the equivalent of «such» where one could very well say «this» or «that». The motivation offered for “preferring to behave ambiguously” is politeness. In other words, in the respective context there would be no semantic difference between saying “approximately two” as opposed to simply “two”, the only difference being that of politeness register.

Even more directly, a source widely used by foreign learners of Japanese (Makino & Tsutsui 1986: 138) states that when saying “Sono ringo o futatsu hodo kudasai” the speaker “does not want *about* two apples but *exactly* two apples [...]” (emphasis in the original). The authors continue:

It is a very common practice in Japanese to avoid asking for exact numbers or amounts, and the practice comes from the idea that being straightforward or direct is impolite. This can be observed in many verbal and nonverbal expressions in Japanese and also in the manners of the Japanese people. (Makino & Tsutsui 1986: 138)

Such stances are entirely speculative, because one can never attest in linguistic analysis what an individual speaker actually “wants” in a concrete situation. Linguistic analysis deals with language as a virtual system of significata and with the strategies of sense-construction in discourse as general possibilities, aiming at the maximal interpretation possible in the given context. Moreover, these stances flatten the level of the semantic organization of the language itself with the level of discourse/texts. On the one hand, the expression “futatsu hodo” is not functionally coincident with “futatsu” at the level of the Japanese language *Gestaltung*; on the other hand, while avoiding precise and straightforward expressions is in fact a discourse strategy used for politeness, this strategy is a general (cross-linguistic) device, applicable in any language the speaker might be using at that moment. One might even counter-speculate that such a strategy could be more frequent in situations that require a higher level of politeness when the speaker uses a language that does not have a clear, lexicalized and grammaticalized, polite language style, as Japanese does.

To clarify this point, let us consider one more example. If one adopts the perspective upheld by the above-mentioned sources, one might say, as some teachers of Japanese as a foreign language do, that in expressions like “ご協力のほど、よろしくお願いいたします” or “ご理解のほど、よろしくお願いいたします”⁷, *hodo* has ‘no meaning’, and is merely used to make the speech more polite. In other words, the expressions with *hodo* are semantically identical with “ご協力を、よろしくお願いいたします” and “ご理解を、よろしくお願いいたします”⁸, but more polite. A clever student might then ask, like the linguist who adopts a genuinely functional perspective: Why is it that the presence of *hodo* and not some other word makes the expressions more polite? The answer, of course, is that *hodo* (程) fully maintains and brings into the utterance its systemic significatum, of «extent», «measure» or

⁷ *Go-kyōryoku / Go-rikai no hodo, yoroshiku onegai-itashimasu*, corresponding to “We kindly ask for your cooperation / understanding”.

⁸ *Go-kyōryoku / Go-rikai wo, yoroshiku onegai-itashimasu* (the same expressions, but without *hodo*).

«degree» of an action or state. Thus, the expressions “ご協力/ご理解のほど、よろしくお願いいたします” literally signify «What we ask of you only goes to the extent of your cooperation/understanding», or «What we ask of you is only your cooperation/understanding and nothing more», «Please grant us your cooperation/understanding and we will not impose on you any more than that ». It is precisely this act of specifying the limit (= the extent or degree) of the request, with the implicit promise of not asking for more, that justifies the possibility of using those expressions to signal (not signify!) higher politeness on the level of discourse acts. Far from being a semantically etiolated or marginal use of *hodo*, such expressions instantiate the very core of the word's (systemic) significatum, and can safely be ranged among the 'prototypical' uses of this linguistic unit.

The aspects discussed above converge towards the need for a theoretical model with immediate analytical applicability that explains such phenomena coherently, from the broader angle of the relationship between language (linguistic conceptualization), discourse (construction of textual meaning) and logic, a model also apt to clarify, for instance, why and in what (different) ways all the four sequences exemplified in the *Introduction* do in fact require a suspension of 'logic'⁹. No less important is that the model in question should reflect and therefore correspond to the speakers' own knowledge at work in the production and interpretation of texts, as opposed to an artificial theoretical construct retroactively and speculatively projected onto the speakers' competence.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Two types of « logic » and their relation with language

In order to devise a clarifying framework of analysis, the diverse acceptations and uses of the term « logic » itself need to be addressed first. What concerns us here are only those acceptations that relate directly to the structure and functioning of language(s) and/or are used as instruments for describing and explaining the structure and functioning of language(s). As early as the 1950s, Eugenio Coseriu advocated for a clear-cut distinction between two acceptations of « logic » which constitute the principal source of confusion in the matter under discussion – a confusion that had already become apparent at that time, both in the philosophy of language and in linguistics, in the latter domain more pregnantly so with the advent of generativism. Two Coserian studies are of particular interest in this respect: “*Logicismo y antilogicismo en la gramática*” (1957), and, two decades later, “*Lógica del lenguaje y lógica de la gramática*” (1976), where the issue is confronted again, since the confusions seemed to have grown deeper, this time due to the rising popularity of pragmatic approaches to language use.

⁹ It is evident that an oversimplified evaluation in terms of grammaticality (idiomatic 'correctness') vs. acceptability is insufficient for covering the actual structure, meaning construction strategies and effect produced by our four initial examples, and, in general, the ample variety of cases that can be found in genuine texts.

Coseriu's claim is that linguistics is held to explain and justify the authentic linguistic knowledge of the speaking subject. One must therefore operate a clear conceptual separation between the following two kinds of logic ("Logic₁" and "Logic₂"), which differ in terms of content, status, role and epistemic level.

- (1) "Logic₁" = the universal principles of thought which ensure the coherence and consistency of speech, associated with the norms of congruence (i.e. compatibility with our experience of the empirical world) which manifest themselves in speaking as a generally-human activity, rationally prior to language-specific semantic organization.

This type of « logic » is closer to what is often called 'common sense': the principles of rational thought rooted in the normality of our ordinary, everyday experience in the world. For example, in the absence of a belief in the constancy of an object's identity, the use of substitutes and pronominal reference would be impossible. One can only meaningfully say "Please go outside and wait for me *there*" if one believes that the spatial order of the immediate environment and the world at large will not collapse or radically change from one moment to the next. Other examples are: an intuitive principle of non-contradiction (an entity cannot be at the same time and from the same point of view itself and its opposite), the realization that a causal relation implies temporal succession (the cause must precede its effect), the understanding of quantitative progression (2 comes after = is more than 1; 3 comes after = is more than 2 and not the other way round) etc. These principles and norms are not self-evident or biologically given, but are developed experientially and reinforced culturally, as part of the cognitive formation of the speaking subject. Thus, "Logic₁" is the speaking subject's constant companion, an inherent part of his/her intuitive knowledge, inseparable from every instance of speech activity.

- (2) "Logic₂" = the *science* of logic, which comprises principles and rules for establishing the validity of judgments; by extension, the science/technique of of argumentative reasoning.

"Logic₂" is an artificial construct pertaining to the level of reflexive-theoretical (epistemic) knowledge in a particular field of scientific endeavor, which is obtained by (i) the reduction of language to one of its aspects of manifestation (the "apophantic", governed by the values of truth vs. falsehood¹⁰) and (ii) progressive abstractization – in other words a *post-linguistic* epistemic construct.

For the knowledge of language(s), only "Logic₁" is relevant. However, as will be illustrated in the following sections, in the domain of speech, the norms of "Logic₁" are twice suspendable: through the peculiar semantic organization of each language as a historically and culturally constituted tradition of speech, and through

¹⁰ For the characteristics of the "apophantic" orientation of discourse and its relation to other types of orientations defined on the basis of Aristotelian concepts, see Coseriu 1969: 77 and 2003: 87-88.

the situationally-bound adequacy judgments pertaining to the level of discourse. As for “Logic₂”, the use of a limited and not too technical part of it may prove relevant in the study of discourse, but only in one type of discourse, the “apophantic” or scientific (informative) – i.e. the type it was originally abstracted from. When applied at this level, the respective strategies do not bear any direct correlation with language-specific semantic *Gestaltung*.

Thus, the proper domain of relevance of “Logic₂” is not that of language(s), but that of the science of language(s), i.e. linguistics¹¹, with its various branches and inclusive of the task of explaining the speakers’ own metalinguistic knowledge.

The idea of “fostering logical thinking through the study of English” invoked in Section 1 obviously refers to a certain system of reasoning pertaining to Logic₂. However, as noted before, Logic₂ has no direct bearing on the structure of the English language as such, and cannot be derived from discourse in English as such. To put it more directly, when we teach English as a foreign language, we do not teach students how to seek for the truth or how to distinguish truth from falsehood, but only the *linguistic means* for positing something as true in the tradition of speaking called “the English language”; we do not teach students how to interact with the interlocutor in order to persuade him/her, but only the *means of expression in English for textual functions* or *discourse acts* such as affirmation, negation, refutation, refusal, acceptance etc.

If teachers and students had unlimited time and resources at their disposal, it would certainly be possible to help students develop their “logical thinking abilities” through the study of a (= any) foreign language. To be sure, the only immediate way to develop the students’ abilities of logical thinking (Logic₂) in the process of learning a foreign language is to practice... applied Logic₂ – in this case the analysis of language structure with the help of a (= any) conceptual framework. This process is the key for enhancing the students’ capacity of generalization and scientific conceptualization. One could certainly point out that such practice is more efficient if performed first by using the students’ native language, and only afterwards in a foreign language, when the focus needs to be placed on learning different means of expression for the same ‘logical₂’ operations. If such intellectual practice starts early enough, around the age of 8 or 9, its benefits will not fail to appear¹².

In utter contrast to developing the (post-linguistic) abilities of logical reasoning, learning a foreign language in a proper way requires dealing with Logic₁. In this process, the speaker needs **to suspend** both the reliance on previous empirical experience, and the reliance on the previous linguistic-conceptual distinctions given by the native tongue.

¹¹ It is in this sense that Coseriu emphasizes, in a critical observation to extreme antilogicism, that all science is ‘logical’, including the science of an object such as language, which is not, in itself, of a logical nature: “Toda ciencia es lógica por ser *ciencia*, y no por ser ciencia de un *objeto lógico*. [...] Hasta el estudio de un objeto «irracional» – si es estudio y no contemplación – es necesariamente racional.” (Coseriu 1957: 252-253; emphasis in the original)

¹² Unfortunately, this is neither done in Japan at present, nor something the educational decision-makers seem to envisage for the future.

For the analysis and explanation of genuine speech (genuine texts) from the internal perspective of the speaking subject's own knowledge and activity, only Logic₁ is relevant, and it is this acceptance that will concern us in the present contribution.

2.2. Levels and forms of « language »

The second aspect that needs to be clarified is precisely what we mean by « language » in the discussion about the relation between language and logic. The framework I propose to use here is Eugenio Coseriu's « integral » map for the study of language as a creative cultural activity, with a detailed account of its levels and forms of manifestation¹³. Language, or, rather, *speaking* (Sp. “el hablar”, Germ. “das Sprechen”) is a generally-human activity (Level I), carried out according to historically established communitary traditions of speech (Level II) in concrete situations as an expression of individual signifying intentions (Level III). Each *level of manifestation* (universal, historical, individual) is functionally autonomous, with its own specific type of linguistic *competence* (elocutional, idiomatic, expressive) and specific *products*, subjected to specific *judgments of conformity* (congruence, correctness, adequacy) (see Table 2). The principles and norms of Logic₁ are part of the speaker's “elocutional” competence, being thus situated on Level I in the general map. In the present analysis we will focus on the last column, of the types of meaning and the evaluations of speech according to the norms of each level, also taking into account further sub-categorizations of the levels, where necessary.

Table 2. Eugenio Coseriu's triadic model: Levels and forms of language, with their associated evaluations

VIEWPOINT LEVEL	Activity <i>Enérgeia</i>	Knowledge (Competence) <i>dynamis</i>	Product <i>ergon</i>	Type of meaning & {Evaluation}
I. Universal Speaking in general (universally-human activity)	Speech in general	Elocutional	Empirically infinite totality of utterances	Designation { Congruence }
II. Historical Particular languages (idiomatic traditions)	Concrete language	Idiomatic	[Abstract language]	Signification { Correctness }
III. Individual Discourse / Text (individual speech)	Discourse	Expressive	Text	Sense { Adequacy }

¹³ Coseriu 1955-56: 285-287, 1973/1981, Ch.10, and 1988: 59, 70-75 (with the table at p. 75 – translation mine, E.T.-M.). An extended presentation and discussion can be found in Tămăianu(-Morita) 2001: 15-60, 2012a, 2015 and 2016.

2.3. The evaluations of speech on each level

Numerous Coserian studies starting from the 1950s discuss at length, substantiate and amply illustrate the autonomy of the evaluations of speech according to the conformity or non-conformity with the principles, rules or norms attestable in the knowledge (competence) of speakers on each level. The fundamental notions, with examples from many different languages, can be found in concise systematizations in the volume dedicated to text linguistics (1981: 41-43) and in the monographic volume on the nature and components of linguistic competence (1988: 76-127). A synopsis of the subcategorization of the judgments of textual adequacy (*Angemessenheit*) can also be found in the latter source (1988: 174-181). Here we will briefly highlight the most important points to be taken into account in the present discussion.

On Level I, the evaluation of speech is manifested in judgments of **congruence** with the general principles of rational thought and with our normal experience in the empirical world (“the knowledge of things”, including the knowledge of the contexts and the universe of discourse). When necessary to separate the two broad cases and operate subclassifications, the first is also termed “coherence” in Coseriu’s model. The principles and norms of Level I are supra-idiomatic: they represent the background of any act of speech, their knowledge is activated spontaneously and most often they need not be verbalized. Furthermore, being intuitive in nature and taken for granted, an inventory is neither feasible, nor necessary. One can easily recognize when such a principle or norm has not been observed, and assess the utterance as incongruent. Thus, a sentence like “The five continents are four: Europe, Asia and Africa.” is incongruent because the quantities denominated by the numbers 5, 4 and 3 cannot be equal. In the case of the sentence “The scene of the crime was a small apartment, and it occurred three months ago.” the incongruence arises from breaking a principle of identity of relation required by the coordination (“the scene” designates a place, but “it” shifts to the designation of the event)¹⁴.

Tautologies are also typical examples of incongruence, as they verbalize overlapping information in constructions where new information should appear. For example, in answer to the reporter’s question about the reasons of customer dissatisfaction in a TV street interview, one interviewee answered “不満の理由は、やっぱり、満足できないことですな。”¹⁵, with a structure topic–comment where the comment is expected to provide new information about the topic. In another TV broadcast, the comment “この文化をなくしてはいけなないので、残さないとはいけません。”¹⁶ violates the principle that the (explanatory) cause and effect cannot be identical.

On the other hand, in a sentence like “I went to the dentist to extract the square root of a tooth” the incongruence is caused by the sudden shift from the

¹⁴ These examples are discussed in Coseriu (1988: 89-90, 93).

¹⁵ *Fuman no riyū wa, yappari manzoku dekinai koto desu ne.* (lit. “The reason for my dissatisfaction is, well, that I can’t be satisfied [with the product]”)

¹⁶ *Kono bunka wo nakushite wa ikenai node, nokosanai to ikenai to omoimasu.* (lit. “Because this cultural tradition should not be lost, I think it has to be preserved”)

universe of discourse of everyday life (where dentists extract the patients' teeth in the course of treatment) to the universe of discourse of mathematics (where extracting the "square root" is a numerical operation). This is a case of non-conformity with the "knowledge of the world" organized in the "circumstances" (*entornos*) of speech¹⁷.

On Level II, the judgments of **correctness** include not only grammatical correctness, but the conformity with all the rules and norms of a language as a historically-constituted tradition of speech, comprising all its structural layers, including the layers of lexical structuring, and all the varieties attested as part of that tradition. Thus, in English the sentence "There isn't no time." will be evaluated as incorrect if the double negation is not allowed by the grammatical rules in the neutral register to which *isn't* belongs. However, the sentence "There ain't no time." has to be recognized as correct in certain dialects, sociolects or language styles (e.g. the colloquial register), even though it is not in conformity with the rules of the current standard norm of English. In other words, on Level II it is important to recognize as "correct" not only what is "exemplary", i.e. in accordance with the (/a) standard variant, but everything that applies the rules and norms of the 'real' language, with its variety dimensions and its historical dynamicity.

Naturally, the judgements of correctness even for similar linguistic facts will differ in each language. For instance, double negation may be incorrect or non-exemplary in English, but correct and exemplary in other languages (Romanian among them).

Finally, the evaluations of textual **adequacy** are the most complex, comprising criteria of conformity with respect to the interlocutor (the relation between speaking subject and interlocutor), to the object or referential content of the discourse, and to the situation of speech. For example, "I need your recommendation letter ASAP." in a mail from a student to a teacher is both congruent and correct, but inadequate with respect to the interlocutor. Conversely, the 'broken'-style utterances used when addressing a baby or a foreigner who barely knows the language in question are incorrect (in the case of "baby talk", possibly also incongruent), but adequate with respect to the interlocutor¹⁸.

2.4. The principle of "suspendability from bottom to top"

A general principle of suspendability "from bottom to top" articulates the three levels (see *Figure 1*). The evaluations of non-conformity can be suspended "from bottom to top", i.e. the norms of the more general level can be suspended by the norms of the more determined (specific) level. Thus, if a verbal sequence is adequate as a text at least from one point of view, it no longer matters that it may be incorrect or incongruent. Similarly, if a verbal sequence becomes part of a linguistic tradition (a particular language), it no longer matters that it may be incongruent. Coseriu insists

¹⁷ A very detailed classification, along with a multidimensional explanation of the function of the *entornos* in speech, within the ground plan for a "universal" linguistics, i.e. a linguistics of Level I, are put forward in Coseriu (1955-1956).

¹⁸ Coseriu notes that a text can be adequate and inadequate at the same time, from different points of view, and that complete adequacy from all points of view may be hard to encounter in genuine texts (1988: 180).

that suspending a judgment of non-conformity should be understood in the phenomenological sense (*Aufhebung*) of “putting out of force / out of effect”, or “overriding” (“ausser Kraft [setzen]”, 1981: 43): the suspended principle, rule or norm is never annulled or eliminated, and its non-observance remains recognizable within the judgment of adequacy.




Figure 1. Suspending the judgments of non-conformity

Thus, Engl. “I saw it with my own eyes.”, Ro. “am văzut cu ochii mei” (lit. «I saw it with my eyes»), Jp. “自分の目で見た” represent instances where correctness suspends incongruence (from Level II → I): the expressions are fixed in the respective languages as idiomatic phrases and on this level the tautology is accepted and receives a new function, that of emphasis. Incidentally, in Japanese the variant “この目で見た” (lit.) «I saw it with these eyes») is also possible, whereas in Romanian it is not (the idiomatic phrase “am văzut cu ochii ăștia” does not exist). Other typical examples can be found in the domain of grammatical agreement. In languages where adjectives have the category of number, the plural form has to be used when the superordinate term designates more than one entity, but this principle can be suspended in certain constructions. For instance, in Romanian the correct expression for “Japanese language and culture” is “limba și cultura japoneză”, with the adjective in the singular, and not “limba și cultura japoneze”, with the adjective in the plural. Suspending incongruence through the specific semantic organization of particular languages will be examined in Section 3.

In discourse/texts (from Level III → I), we can encounter three basic types of suspension of incongruence: the metaphorical, the metalingual, and what Coseriu terms “the extravagant”.

(a) The diverse mechanisms of the metaphorical suspension are presented in detail in Coseriu (1952: 81-82). Metaphor should not be reduced to a simple linguistic transposition or “abridged comparison”. To the contrary, metaphor is a central mechanism of meaning construction, as “a unitary, spontaneous and immediate expression of a vision”, without any intermediate element. Broadly speaking, this can imply (i) a momentary identity of distinct objects, (ii) the hyperbolization of a particular aspect of the object, and (iii) can reach up to an identification of opposites, logically ‘absurd’ but meaningful and conducive to ironic effects in certain situations of speech.

(b) The metalingual suspension presents the incongruence as the content of another speech by quoting it.

(c) The “extravagant” suspension intentionally constructs the text in a contradictory fashion; the signifying intent itself is that of expressing the absurd, as in textual fragments (3) and (4) from the Introduction.

Phenomena of suspending incongruence through adequacy will be examined in Part II of our study.

2.5. Discussion

Whether a judgment of incongruence is actually suspended or not in concrete acts of discourse depends on many individual factors, and does not fall within the range of the tasks which can be assumed by linguistic analysis. What can be done with the analytic tools of linguistics is to assess and explain the suspendability or lack of suspendability of incongruence, and the ensuing effects on the sense of the text/utterance. Let us examine two genuine Japanese examples.

(1) The first comes from a popular TV show¹⁹ that presents less known information on various topics and asks the host Osamu Hayashi, a charismatic preparatory school teacher turned TV personality, to either explain the topic if he had advance knowledge of it, or admit his defeat if the information is new even to him. Confronted with a topic he was completely unable to explain, the host declared “完全にぼくの完敗です。” (*kanzen ni boku no kanpai desu*, lit. approx. «It is completely my total defeat.»). If this expression were fixed as an idiomatic phrase in the Japanese language, the incongruence (tautology) would be suspended on Level II and the formulation would be interpreted as emphatic. However, if this is not the case, then the incongruence remains in effect on Level II, and we can proceed towards examining if the incongruence can be suspended through adequacy, at the level of sense-construction in the given text, in other words if the logical error was produced with a recognizable signifying intention. One candidate for such an interpretation would be an intended ironic effect – self-irony, to be more precise. Having to admit his lack of knowledge on the given topic, the speaker exaggerates his failure by breaking a rule of Logic₁, thus feigning ignorance in this respect too. As this was an oral discourse in front of the TV cameras, paralinguistic elements such as intonation and voice inflection, combined with nonverbal elements such as eye movement, facial expression, posture etc. could be used by the viewer in order to assess if an ironic effect was intended or not. If such intentionality cannot be detected, then the incongruence would remain in effect, and the expression would be qualified as nothing more than a mistake.

(2) Interviewed for a news program²⁰, the victim of a natural disaster that had recently hit his region commented on how important it was to make advance preparations for emergency situations, declaring: “そういうことを改めて再確認できました。” (*sō iu koto wo aratamete saikakunin dekimashita*, lit. approx. «I reconfirmed this fact to myself once again»). The formulation can often be heard nowadays, probably with the intention of emphasis. However, the effect of emphasis can only be achieved if an incongruence is suspended: according to the norms of

¹⁹ “林先生が驚く初耳学！”, 12 April 2016.

²⁰ “報道ステーション”, 2 April 2016.

Logic₁, if you reconfirm something once again you actually (re)confirm it twice: “確認” presupposes that the information was already known; “再確認” signifies that you became aware of it again, i.e. that the information resurfaced to your attention; “改めて” indicates that the process was repeated. If this usage is adopted on a wide scale and enters the norm of Japanese as an idiomatic phrase, it might become correct for the function of emphasizing the (one-time) reconfirmation, with the incongruence suspended on Level II. As this is not yet the case, and clearly no ironic or humorous effect was intended in the given situation, the incongruence remains in effect and the formulation is qualified as an error.

3. Suspending Logic₁ on the level of particular languages (Level II → I)

3.1. Language-specific signification vs. designational variants

At this point let me invite the reader to perform a mental experiment. Imagine a language that expresses all of the following relations between two entities by one and the same grammatical meaning (/structure) :

• [I] – [book]	my book
• [movies] – [magazine]	magazine about movies
• [wood] – [chair]	wooden chair
• [Romania] – [wine]	Romanian wine
• [(last) week] – [party]	last week’s party
• [president] – [visit]	the president’s visit
• [cat] – [Kuro (proper name)]	Kuro the cat

In other words, you have a language where the possessor of an object, the content of an object, the material of an object, the object’s place of provenance, the time of an event, the agent of an action, and even the appositive relation (in this case the class or species of an individual entity identified by its proper name) are **all** expressed by one and the same grammatical unit. Surely a language that puts all these different ‘meanings’ into one category must be more vague, more indeterminate, less logical than English (?). Surely this must be a language where ample areas of designation are organized in categories with blurred semantic borderlines (?).

This language, of course, is real: it the prototype of the «blurred semiotic articulation» pole in Ikegami’s model, Japanese, and the expressions in question are:

- 私の本
- 映画の雑誌
- 木のいす
- ルーマニアのワイン
- 先週のパーティー
- 大統領の訪問
- ネコのクロちゃん

I have often asked Romanian students just beginning to study Japanese as a foreign language to perform the same experiment and try to imagine the nature of the

grammatical structure that can unify all these ‘meanings’ (or uses)²¹, a riddle they have always found impossible to solve. Conversely, I have asked Japanese students to find the English correspondents of the Japanese sequences, with the result of all-too-familiar errors (overgeneralizing the uses of the genitive case or of the preposition *of*), accompanied by a sense of wonder at the confusion that seems to reign in English, where so many different structures have to be used in order to obtain natural expressions.

In the didactic setting, this experiment was meant to make students aware of the risks of looking at isolated linguistic units (both lexical and grammatical) from the outside, and passing judgment on the degree of vagueness or clarity, logic or lack of it in the respective language. The task was deliberately formulated in terms that mix up the levels of semantic organization, exactly as the situation would appear for the lay person learning that language at beginner level.

In fact, in a well-founded linguistic analysis, in this case Japanese appears as much more ‘logical’ and precisely articulated than English. The adnominal particle “no” (N₁ の N₂), always connecting nouns, is an elegant, extremely logical and very economical structure, because the idiomatic (language-specific) function is clearly separated from extra-linguistic knowledge brought to bear in the interpretation of the combinations, whereas in English or in Romanian these two levels of meaning interact in a more complicated way and sometimes overlap. Thus, in the system of the Japanese language the significatum of *no* is merely that of «association between two entities» (N₁ has something to do with N₂); everything else (‘possessor’, ‘material’, ‘provenance’ etc.) is a variant of designation arising from the lexical significata of the nouns placed in the associative relation, interpreted on the basis of our knowledge of the world. Ambiguities in interpretation also appear in the designative process, and not at the level of the grammatical structure as such²².

What the example discussed above indicates is that judgments of “vague” or “blurred” vs. “clear” semiotic articulation are only made as such from an external

²¹ The examples are taken from a textbook used for 1st year students in some Romanian universities (Tămăianu-Morita & Morita 2005: 34-47).

²² For example, in the sequence “コセリウの本”, the possibility of interpreting the relation as one of possession (the book belongs to Coseriu) or one of agentivity (the book was written by Coseriu) does not arise from the grammatical structure itself, or even from the mere combination of the grammatical meaning with the lexical meaning of the two nouns, but from the “knowledge of the world”, which allows us to find most probable (most ‘logical’) designative relations. If we know that “Coseriu” is a human being, then we also accept that he can own things, produce things and so on. Consequently, when teaching the N₁ の N₂ structure, it is both confusing for the students and linguistically inaccurate to say that « no » has “different / diverse meanings”, as some sources do (e.g. Iori *et. al.* 2000: 31), and somehow suggest that students should make an effort to memorize them. On the contrary, the emphasis should be placed on the unitary significatum of « no », defined in functional terms, because the “knowledge of the world” (from Level I, supra-idomatic) will easily be applied in order to identify the most probable designational variant in each context. Although the most frequent and ‘normal’ interpretations may also be perceived by the speaker as ‘codified’, in reality they are not codified in the system of that language, but merely transmitted traditionally in the norm(s) of the language, as significata-in-use (*Sprechbedeutungen*), or designational variants of the significatum.

perspective, not from an internal standpoint of the language in question²³. It therefore appears to me that they are categories of linguistic analysis (meta-categories) rather than categories of the languages themselves. For this external perspective to be justified as a genuine contrastive analysis of languages, it is necessary to distinguish what is organized at Level II, the level of the language itself (with its system and norm) from what is given by the knowledge of the world (Level I), as well as from what is subsequently added at the level of discourse (Level III).

That is why no language is, in and by itself, more vague or more precise, more clearly articulated or more blurred in its semantic organization than any other language. A proper understanding of Humboldt's notion of linguistic relativity can help to avoid the confusion of levels in this matter:

[...] every language draws about the people that possesses it a circle whence it is possible to exit only by stepping over into the circle of another one. To learn a foreign language should therefore be *to acquire a new standpoint in the world-view hitherto possessed*, and in fact to a certain extent is so, since *every language contains the whole conceptual fabric and mode of presentation* of a portion of mankind. (Humboldt 1836/1988: 60; emphasis mine – E.T.-M.)

In this sense, Coseriu (1976: 28-29) notes that languages are not “mosaics” of *significata* covering the same objective delimitations given in the empirical world, and therefore one should not expect to find *the same* or *all* possible distinctions in different languages. Each language puts forward a different conceptualization of the world through its own networks of *significata*, diverse and multi-dimensional, but functionally justified and unitary *as significata*. The appearance of logical heterogeneity or incompleteness arises only when these are regarded from the point of view of designation, or through the distorting lens of distinctions operated by another language and artificially projected onto the language under consideration.

The second micro-text proposed for reflection in the introductory section, “ネコのクロちゃんはネズミを見ると怖がる。” (approx. “Kuro the cat is afraid of mice.”) contains a determinative apposition, ネコ (*neko*, “the cat”), which in Japanese needs to be connected to its superordinate noun, the cat's name Kuro, by the adnominal postposition *no*. In Romanian, the same structure is formed by juxtaposition (*pisica Kuro*)²⁴, and thus appears clearly separated, functionally, from other nominal attributes, where the relation is expressed by case inflection morphemes or prepositions. Without exception, this is a case which Romanian learners of Japanese find extremely difficult to master, and where errors (“ネコクロちゃん”, “クロちゃんネコ”) keep reappearing even after many hours of practice. Simple as this basic grammatical structure may seem, the «no» syntagm is actually a

²³ Similarly, the so-called ‘lexical gaps’ are no gaps at all from an internal standpoint; they simply appear so when a 1:1 correspondence in designation is sought for, mistakenly, in the same structural stratum of different languages.

²⁴ Technically, this is what in Romanian traditional grammar is called a “false apposition”: a nominal attribute in the nominative case.

typical instance of the radical shift of “standpoint in the world-view hitherto possessed”, where the learner has to abandon the mix of signification and designational criteria which motivate the organization of the attributive structures in Romanian and adopt a purely signification definition, in this case of a connective defined only by its formal (instrumental) function²⁵. Strictly speaking, this shift presupposes not so much the suspension of ‘Logic₁’ *per se*, as abandoning the reliance on the primary semantic organization of the world provided by the native tongue, which is often mistaken by the naïve speaker as the ‘natural’ way of things, or ‘*the*’ logic of things.

3.2. Suspending Logic₁ through the organization of lexical significata

Let us now turn our attention to the first micro-text proposed for reflection in the Introduction: “On the 11th of May 2013 I took a day trip by bus from Almería to Córdoba, in order to see the spectacular Festival of the *Patios*.” At first sight, this utterance seems to involve no suspension of logic whatsoever, and appears to be in complete agreement both with the universal principles of rational thought, and with our ordinary experience in the empirical world. Let us focus, however, on the phrase “day trip”, and analyze its language-specific signification and its designation in this particular instance of speech.

In English the lexeme *day* is defined primarily by opposition with the lexeme *night*, as in Figure (2.a.), with their significatum distinguished by the feature <+/- sunlight>, the presence vs. the absence of daylight. The designation may vary according to diverse factors, from equal intervals (at the equinoxes), to one being longer and the other shorter, but neither of them disappearing completely. Thus, in the extreme we may have “white nights” (“白夜”), which are still categorized as *nights* and not as *days*. However, the lexeme *day* can also signify the whole duration of 24 hours²⁶, which includes both the interval of daylight and the interval of darkness (absence of daylight). Thus, one term of the lexical opposition (called the “neutral” term) denominates both ‘itself’ and its opposite (the “marked” term of the opposition): the neutral term includes the semantic area of its opposite. This is a prototypical instance of the well-known and wide-spread phenomenon of “neutralization of lexical oppositions” (Figure 2.b.), which is in itself a typical example of suspending the intuitive principle of non-contradiction from Logic₁

²⁵ In this sense, it can be noted that among the so-called “interference errors” there is a category which is relatively easy to correct, if the learner simply projects into the target language *ad litteram* isolated lexical contents or grammatical structures from another language. There exists, however, a category more radical and difficult to deal with, like the example discussed here, where the learner projects principles and dimensions of semantic organization alien to the target language (with Humboldt’s metaphor, the very “conceptual fabric” of another language). Unless addressed systematically, with rigor and an amount of effort well beyond those required by the first category of interference errors, the latter type of projection risks to become a permanent obstacle to the learner’s progress beyond a rudimentary use of the target language.

²⁶ This can designate either the calendar day, according to the conventions of modern life, or the interval from one morning to the next morning, according to the more general experience of man’s diurnal activity cycle.

(Level I) through the specific semantic organization of a particular language as a traditionally constituted technique of speech (Level II). Since this is a phenomenon pertaining to Level II, it may occur in some languages, but not in others. For comparison, we can note that in Japanese the lexical organization of the same empirical domain of time intervals is completely different (Figure 2.c.), with the lexeme signifying the interval of 24 hours of a calendar day (24 h within the same calendar date) distinct from those roughly correspondent to the opposition by the feature $\langle +/\text{- sunlight} \rangle$, and without a phenomenon of neutralization. The domain conceptualized in English through one lexeme is conceptualized in Japanese by several different primary or compound lexemes. In this respect English can thus be characterized as more ‘vague’ than Japanese.




Figure 2: Functional organization of the lexical meaning of *day*

Thus, when learning and when using the significatum of the English lexeme *day*, the speaker necessarily suspends an incongruence, accepting that one entity can be at the same time itself and its opposite, and this is no longer felt as a contradiction precisely because this is the peculiar means of expression handed down from generation to generation in the tradition of speech called “the English language”. Nevertheless, in a genuine utterance, when the virtual signification of the lexeme is actualized and contextually orientated in order to designate a certain interval of time whose concrete length will differ in each case, situations may appear that bring the phenomenon of neutralization into the speaker’s awareness.

Such was the author’s experience in May 2013 in Spain. Having booked what was advertised as a “day trip” from a local travel agency in the city of Almería, situated on the coast of the Mediterranean, I joined the group at the designated pick-up spot at 6 a.m. on May 11, 2013, when the bus departed towards Córdoba and duly covered the 360 km distance in about 4 hours, after which the sightseeing program began. In the specific terminology of tourist packages, the word *day* is normally used in the narrower acceptation, based on the feature $\langle + \text{ daylight} \rangle$. Thus, a *day trip* would last for a maximum of 12 hours, for example between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. This is also termed a *full-day* trip/tour, as opposed to a *half-day* trip, the latter covering either the first half of a day (e.g. 7:00 to 13:00) or the second half of the day (e.g. 14:00 to 20:00) – with the lexeme *day* used with the same acceptation in all of these cases. Having left Almería at 06:00h for the “day trip”, I naturally expected to be back in the city on the same ... day, later in the evening. Taking into account the

distance to be covered by bus, perhaps a late hour such as 9 or 10 p.m. was within predictable limits. After having finished the guided part of the tour, which included the most beautifully decorated patios in the old city center, as well as the world-famous Mosque-Cathedral (La Mezquita), from around 2 p.m. we were offered free time to visit the sights on our own. To my utmost surprise, the pick-up time for return was announced to be 23:30h (!), with the arrival back in Almería scheduled for around 04:00h on the next day, May 12 – which was indeed faithfully observed by our trustworthy bus driver. It then became evident to me that we had just finished a *day trip* in the sense of the neutral term: a trip that extended over almost 24 hours, so as to give us ample time to enjoy the city of Córdoba, with its splendid architecture, rich history and wonderful festival, when countless houses and gardens are each decorated in a unique way, so that time never seems enough for discovering all of them. Crossing the borderline of the midnight hour, which marks the beginning of the next calendar *day* was not an obstacle in a country where, as I could see on numerous other occasions, people will not let formal or material factors deter them from the fullest enjoyment of cultural experiences. Technically, in Japan, this tour could not have been classified as a *day trip* (1 日ツアー), but very precisely as a two-day trip without hotel accommodation (0 泊 2 日ツアー), with the lexeme “日” designating not just any 24-hour interval, but the calendar day, and no suspension of Logic₁ required for the meaningful interpretation of the linguistic expression in question.

4. Final considerations

4.1. Closing remarks for *Part I*

In the present article I have argued that all languages, as primary systems of signification, *can* and *do* suspend judgments of incongruence with the universal principles of rational thought and with the ordinary experience in the empirical world (“Logic₁”). Consequently, no language is inherently any more or any less ‘logical’ than any other language. As far as ‘vagueness’ is concerned, it only appears as such from an external point of view, when units and structures are extracted from their holistic relations within one language and placed in a direct comparison from the point of view of their designations, again taken in isolation. Thus, ‘vagueness’, if/when attestable, should be treated as a category of linguistic analysis rather than a category of the languages themselves.

On the other hand, “Logic₂”, the science of logic and argumentation, may concern discourse organization in certain types of texts but not in all texts, and can *never* apply to the structure of a language in and by itself, as a virtual system of signification.

Finally, with respect to its treatment of “Logic₁”, the Japanese language is neither more ‘illogical’ nor necessarily more ‘vague’ than the other languages taken for comparison (here, English and Romanian). With respect to the use of “Logic₂”, should it be true that fallacies or failures seem to be more frequent on the Japanese social scene than elsewhere, the culprit is not the Japanese language itself, but the combined effect of other hindering factors, such as failures in the language education

process, erroneous models propagated by the media, individual ignorance and/or indifference and so on.

4.2. Outline of *Part II*

The second part of the present exploration²⁷ will focus on the suspension of Logic₁ on the level of texts (Level III → I), as in the last two cases announced in the Introduction. Text (3) suspends the universal norms of Level I by exploiting the specific organization of grammatical significata in English. On the other hand, Text (4) suspends the norms of Level I with minimal use of the specific lexical and grammatical organization of French, in its aspiration towards becoming the absolute model of incongruent discourse, easily adaptable and recognizable as such even when translated into – in principle – any other language. Thus, in each case the overall signifying intention and sense of the text justifies the way in which the norms of Logic₁ are suspended, and these mechanisms function as a means of expression for a meaning of a higher rank than significata and designata, which is textual sense²⁸.

Finally, the triadic model of analysis proposed here in the framework of Coseriu's theoretical outlook on language will be compared with two other theoretical orientations relevant for the issue under discussion:

- (i) Beaugrande and Dressler's (1981) "principles of textuality": seven "constitutive" principles (cohesion, coherence, intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality and intertextuality) and three "regulative" principles (efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness);
- (ii) pragmatic accounts based on Grice's (1975, 1989) Cooperative Principle and conversational maxims, implicatures and presuppositions, with the phenomena of intentional non-observance (opting out, flouting, suspension).

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²⁷ Part II will be prepared for publication in a future issue of the *Journal of International Studies*, Kindai University.

²⁸ The relation between significata and designata on the one hand, and textual sense on the other hand, as elements in the double semiotic articulation of discourse, is analyzed in Tămăianu-Morita (2012a, 2012b, 2014, 2016).

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Capitalism, Individualism, and Gender Equality: What Can Improve Work Safety?

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ABSTRACT: This study compares fatal injuries in the workplace from economic, social, and cultural international viewpoints in order to determine the factors in these fatalities. Our world is faced by work-related disasters that have become routine in everyday life. Given that deaths by occupational injuries and disasters were annually estimated at no less than 2 million people worldwide in 2001 (ILO), while war-related deaths accounted for less than 0.2 million people in 2002 (WHO), we live with greater risk of being killed at work than at war. If our basic daily needs require us to work, no one can escape with certainty from work-related accidents, so we must prevent these ordinary disasters. In this context, we investigate various countries to understand relations between work-related disasters and economic, social, and cultural factors in these disasters and to reveal what are the most important factors in improving the situation. The research method in this study is basically a co-relation analysis of global statistics mainly provided by ILO, WHO, the UN, and the World Bank. Based on these analyses, one of the most important conclusions of this study is that a high degree of gender equality and individuality can have positive effects on workplace safety, and that, in other words, a gender-free and individualistic society could allow us to make safer workplaces that improve standards of living in moral and material ways. This hypothetical conclusion is meant to be a principle benchmark for better maintaining and promoting work safety and effective installation of safety devices in the workplace. This benchmark would be very useful not only for professionals, but also for all employers and employees with leading roles in the workplace.

KEYWORDS: Safety, Workplace, Gender, Individualism, Thailand, Japan

1. INTRODUCTION

The starting point of this study is the following question: why do workplace accidents happen much less in developed countries than other countries? For example, Vietnam is 30 times as hazardous as the United Kingdom when it comes to fatal workplace accidents (see Appendix 1). To the contrary, the U.K.'s GDP based

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on purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita is 18 times as large as Vietnam's as of 2001. Moreover, the top 24 countries totally occupied by Established Market Economies (EME)¹ together comprise only 5%² of fatal work-related accidents in the world (see Appendix 1), so there is a large disparity in safety practices between industrialised countries and developing ones. It also seems that economic development is a strong factor in improving safety at work. However, is it correct that economic development ensures workplace safety? And, if so, how do developed countries keep their workplaces safer than non-developed ones?

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), there is a very large imbalance of fatalities in the workplace among countries. At a glance of the list of 119 countries in order of low-risk workplaces, which shows that work safety is very unbalanced from country to country, it is not difficult to see that developed countries occupy the higher ranks on the list (see Appendix 1). It seems that this means the more a country achieves economic growth, the safer its workplaces are.

On the other hand, in Thailand, the manufacturing and services sectors account for about 80% of the annual expansion of GDP (Thepakorn and Pongpanich 2014: 6), which indicates its economic growth as well as its industrialisation. However, its performance in workplace safety is very low. In fact, Thailand is ranked 107th out of 119 countries for workplace safety (see Appendix 1). In addition to this, Japan experienced contradictory tendencies before the 1960s by improving its economic growth while increasing fatal injuries at work. A nationwide work safety campaign began in 1917, after which many efforts were made to improve workplace safety (Horiguchi 2011; Horiguchi 2016). What do these cases mean? Do they mean that economic growth does not always allow us to maintain and improve safety at work?

This article attempts to reveal how relations between safety and social conditions are associated with each other by examining major international indices. First, we must review the aforementioned list of 119 countries in order of workplace risk before examining the factors in improving workplace safety by analysing more than one hundred countries (including regions and areas), with a GDP index, individualism index (IDV), and gender inequality index (GII).

2. METHOD

Among the 193 countries, territories, and areas listed in the table on occupational accidents and work-related diseases that ILO provided (ILO 2005), the 119 countries listed in Appendix 1 had enough data to be eligible for analysis. Fatality rate was calculated with the following formula:

¹ The countries listed as having EME are as follows: Andorra, Australia, Canada, Gibraltar, Iceland, Japan, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Switzerland, the United States, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (ILO 2005: 33).

² EME nations had 15 879 fatalities according to ILO Global Estimates on Fatal Accidents 2001, among

$$\text{Fatality} = \frac{\text{Fatal injuries}}{\text{Total employment}} \times 100\,000$$

Using GDP, GII, and IDV, we analysed correlations between nations and fatal accidents in the workplace. The data are based on 2001 statistics given by *Introductory Report: Decent Work - Safe Work* (ILO 2005) and other sources supplied by the World Bank³, the UN,⁴ and Hofstede (2001). As for GII, the data came from 2005, because data was lacking in some major countries, such as Canada, Greece, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and the United States. The number of fatal injuries alone was considered for this analysis, while non-fatal injuries and work-related diseases were omitted in order to simplify discussion.

To know whether other factors could contribute largely to work safety, we examined fatality correlations with GII and IDV, as well as GDP based on PPP per capita.

3. FINDINGS

We explored more than a hundred countries to discuss positive factors in workplace safety based on the statistics given by ILO (2005). However, the correlation between fatality and GDP based on PPP per capita had a strong negative correlation coefficient, -0.80^{***} ($^{***}p < .001$; two-tailed test). In addition to this, when we calculated fatality correlations with GII and IDV, we obtained the following findings across the 62 countries that provided enough data to be compared in this study (See Table 1).

Table 1. Fatality Correlations with GDP, GII, and IDV

Index	Correlation	Coefficient ($-1 < r < 1$)
GDP	Strong (negative)	-0.80^{***}
GI	Strong (positive)	0.83^{***}
IDV	Strong (negative)	-0.78^{***}

$^{***}p < .001$

4. DISCUSSION

Appendix 1 shows that, to take an example, the U.K. ranked near the top, with 0.8 fatalities per 100 000, while Thailand was nearly at the bottom, with a

³ The World Bank. GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$), World Bank, International Comparison Program Database. Retrieved 14 August 2017, from <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD>.

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
fatality rate of 21 per 100 000. This is to say that there was an enormous disparity between the U.K. and Thailand in 2001, with 26 times the work-related fatal injury rate in Thailand than in the U.K. Comparing Iceland with Namibia, it was found that there was a more than 45-fold imbalance of fatality rates in the workplace globally.⁵ As we see below, Thailand has remarkably improved over the past decade because of her success in bravely reducing the fatality rate. Graph 1 shows that the work-related fatal injury rate in Thailand has fallen sharply: a more than one-third decline in 24 years.

However, the question is why Thailand is still almost at the bottom of the list, despite its economic growth during this period. Thailand is characterised by a collectivist culture and, so far as GII is concerned (0.405 in 2005), far from a gender-free society.⁶

As far as GDP per capita is concerned, we obtained the following result: the more an individual's productivity increases, the more their chance of fatality decreases. However, other indices show a similarly favourable result, namely GII and IDV.

GI, provided by the UN, represents lack of development in terms of inequity between men and women, with the following conclusion: the more gender equality is achieved, the more fatalities go down. IDV indicates the degree to which people prefer to act as individuals rather than as members of groups; Hofstede's book

Graph 1. Work-related Fatal Injury Rate in Thailand, 1982-2007⁷



⁵ This was the fact as of 2001. For the honour of Thailand and Namibia, these rates in fatal injury represent a situation from more than a decade ago.


⁶ GII is 0.405 as of 2005. The GII values vary in the range from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates complete equality between men and women. See the United Nations. *Human Development Reports, Gender Inequality Index*. Retrieved 14 August 2017, from <http://hdr.undp.org/fr/content/gender-inequality-index>.

⁷ ILO. LABORSTA, ILO Database on Labour Statistics. Retrieved 10 October 2012, from <http://laborsta.ilo.org/> (now not available). The data are as follows: 33.8 in 1982; 31.2 in 1983; 31.7 in 1984; 28.9 in 1985; 30.8 in 1986; 31.9 in 1987; 21.9 in 1988; 22.4 in 1989; 30.9 in 1990; 21.1 in 1991; 24.5 in 1992; 29.2 in 1993; 19.2 in 1994; 19.4 in 1995; 17.7 in 1996; 17.1 in 1997; 15.4 in 1998; 11.5 in 1999; 11.3 in 2000; 10.9 in 2001; 9.9 in 2002; 11.2 in 2003; 11.7 in 2004; 18.7 in 2005; 10.1 in 2006; 9.1 in 2007.

Culture's Consequences refers to this index. In this case, we obtained the following result: the more individualistic people become, the more fatalities decrease.

The findings above do not always assert that socio-economic and cultural changes caused reductions in fatalities; still, they reveal that these changes have much to do with fatality prevention. In other words, safer workplaces spread in richer, more gender-free, and more individualistic societies. The question in this study is to know whether improved fatality rates linearly correspond to these socio-economic and cultural changes or not.

Graph 2. Work-related Fatal Injuries in Japan, 1953-2011⁸



As seen in Graph 2 above, there was a long-term change in fatal work-related injuries in Japan between 1953 and 2011, not always decreasing but reaching its peak in 1961. In short, it surprisingly shows that, in the period before 1961, economic development did not correspond to a fall in fatalities.

Why did fatalities keep rising before 1961? When it comes to road traffic accidents, 1970 saw the highest number of deaths in Japan (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2016: 26). That is, whether referring to safety at work or on the road, the 1960s were the worst decade for safety despite being the best decade for economic growth. Given that the 1960s was the worst decade for safe workplaces and safe communities, it is difficult to understand that the decade was also when Japan experienced its most economically powerful growth since World War II.

For this reason, it seems that an economic factor does not play an essential role in maintaining a safe environment; rather, it suggests that another factor or factors account for this turning point. Such cultural factors such as gender equality and individuality enable us to explain this complicated tendency, not only as a correlation but also as causation. In a society with gender equality and respect for individual lives, people are more likely to be aware of their own security because of their relative independence from partners, family, or community.

⁸ Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. *Statistics of Occupational Injuries*. Retrieved 14 August 2017, from <http://anzeninfo.mhlw.go.jp/user/anzen/tok/anst00.htm>. Deaths in the Tohoku earthquake in 2011 are excluded from the data; Japan Industrial Safety & Health Association. *Occupational Injuries records in Japan from 1953 to 2009*. Retrieved 14 August 2017, from <https://www.jisha.or.jp/info/suii.html>.

5. CONCLUSION

Each year, many people shed their blood and lose their lives in the workplace. The ILO estimates that more than 350 000 people⁹ are killed annually by accidents at work worldwide. In addition to these fatalities caused by work-related accidents, workers suffer occupational diseases as well. The number of fatalities caused by diseases was estimated at 1.7 million.¹⁰ In short, no less than 2 million people are killed at work every year. On the other hand, it is ironic that the number of victims killed in wars was estimated at 172 000 people at most in 2002 worldwide (WHO 2004: 124).

In other words, more than 2 million people lose their lives at work each year, while there are no more than 0.2 million victims of war-related fatalities annually. Does this mean that labour is more than 10 times crueller than warfare? Even if the etymological meaning of 'labour' stands for 'painful toil', it is not common to accept such an enormous quantity of victims without feeling pain. This is to say that, in this sense, the workplace poses a grave threat to our everyday lives.¹¹

Surrounded by more risks in peacetime than in wartime, one is obliged to live amid perpetual 'warfare' built into our daily life. In this sense, everyone *consumes* not only goods and services but also, as it were, an enormous amount of human beings in everyday life; this is a reality of consumer society. We nonetheless cannot stop working so long as we live, and we cannot escape from accidents so long as we work.

Even though labour is essentially cruel, it is also possible to ease or reduce such pains. And, it goes without saying that we have been making every effort to facilitate safety in the workplace. However, reality shows that it may be significant to ask why fatalities differ from one country to another. What causes such differences?

We observed that, although GDP correlates with lower fatalities, economic development in some cases (for example, the case of Japan) can be a factor in preventing from reductions in fatalities. This means that economic growth does not always successfully improve safety. And, this is to say it is possible that workplace safety changes much more with socio-cultural transformations than economic ones. As we see above, the indices of GII and IDV give us a benchmark to measure the value of safe workplaces.

While we have often underestimated risks in the workplace, labour is part of our everyday life, so it is very important to enhance social values such as equality between men and women (gender-free) or among people (individualistic), if we want to live in safer communities.

Once an accident has occurred, anyone who is in a vulnerable position can fall victim to the accident. While national economic growth sometimes creates

⁹ The ILO estimates the victims at 351 251 (ILO 2005: 32).

¹⁰ The ILO estimates them at 1 697 061 (ILO 2005: 6).

¹¹ It should not be ignored that there are a large of victims on the road; 1.2 million people are estimated to be killed in road traffic crashes each year worldwide, and, in particular, it is pedestrians who fall victim the most to accidents (WHO 2004: 3).

disparities between the rich and poor and brings about inequity on the heels of prosperity, gender-free values can be considered a factor in reducing or moderating cleavages between men and women, while individualistic values are possibly a factor in communities where each of us is accepted as a person.

Confronting safety inequity and injustice not only among countries but also among people, we are implored to build communities which treat men and women equally and accepts everyone equally as an individual. This must be one of the most important guidelines for today's safety culture, as well as for an open society where everyone is welcome.

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Appendix 1. 119 Countries in Order of Low-risk Workplaces
Source: *Introductory Report: Decent Work - Safe Work* (ILO 2005)

*62 countries examined with GDP, GII, and IDV.

	Country (Country Code)	Total Employment	Fatal Accidents	Fatality Rate
1	Iceland (ISL)	159000	1	0.62893081761
2	United Kingdom (GBR)*	28225400	236	0.83612632593
3	Netherlands (NLD)*	7865000	116	1.4748887476
4	Sweden (SWE)*	4239000	63	1.4861995754
5	Norway (NOR)*	2278000	42	1.8437225637
6	Belgium (BEL)*	4051200	78	1.9253554502
7	Switzerland (CHE)*	4156000	81	1.9489894129
8	Denmark (DNK)*	2725100	56	2.0549704598
9	Greece (GRC)*	3917500	90	2.2973835354
10	Australia (AUS)*	9123900	236	2.5866131808
11	Finland (FIN)*	2388000	64	2.6800670017
12	Germany (DEU)*	36816000	1107	3.0068448501
13	France (FRA)*	24113225	730	3.0273843503
14	Japan (JPN)*	64120000	2016	3.1441048035
15	Austria (AUT)*	3799600	137	3.6056426992
16	New Zealand (NZL)*	1823400	78	4.2777229352
17	Ireland (IRL)*	1716500	74	4.3110981649
18	Malta (MLT)*	145587	7	4.8081216043
19	United States (USA)*	135073000	6643	4.9180813338
20	Luxembourg (LUX)*	277000	16	5.7761732852
21	Italy (ITA)*	21634000	1397	6.4574281224
22	Canada (CAN)*	15076800	1035	6.864851958
23	Spain (ESP)*	15945600	1160	7.2747340959
24	Portugal (PRT)*	4999800	414	8.2803312132
25	Singapore (SGP)*	2046700	178	8.6969267602
26	Azerbaijan (AZE)	3715000	325	8.7483176312
27	San Marino (SMR)	11404	1	8.768853034
28	Estonia (EST)*	577700	53	9.1743119266
29	Russia (RUS)*	64710000	6276	9.6986555401
30	Moldova (MDA)	1499000	146	9.739826551
31	India (IND)*	402510000	40133	9.9706839582
32	Hungary (HUN)*	3859500	389	10.079025781
33	Latvia (LVA)	1037000	105	10.12536162
34	Tajikistan (TJK)	1143000	116	10.148731409
35	Poland (POL)*	14207000	1463	10.29774055
36	French Polynesia (PYF)	58149	6	10.318320177
37	South Korea (KOR)*	21068000	2214	10.508828555
38	Kyrgyzstan (KGZ)	1764300	186	10.542424758
39	Georgia (GEO)	1877600	199	10.598636557
40	Uzbekistan (UZB)	8885000	957	10.770962296
41	Kazakhstan (KAZ)	6698800	743	11.091538783

42	Kuwait (KWT)	1243126	138	11.101046877
43	Czech Republic (CZE)*	4728000	525	11.104060914
44	Lithuania (LTU)	1521800	169	11.105270075
45	Belarus (BLR)	4417400	494	11.183048852
46	Romania (ROU)*	10696900	1209	11.30233993
47	Bulgaria (BGR)*	2751500	317	11.520988552
48	Armenia (ARM)	1264900	146	11.54241442
49	Ukraine (UKR)	20238100	2341	11.567291396
50	Albania (ALB)	1063000	125	11.759172154
51	Slovakia (SVK)*	2123700	257	12.10152093
52	Sao Tome and Principe (STP)	49000	6	12.244897959
53	China (CHN)*	733705100	90295	12.3067156
54	Macedonia (MKD)	599308	75	12.514433313
55	Croatia (HRV)*	1469500	184	12.521265737
56	United Arab Emirates (ARE)	1779000	224	12.591343451
57	Malaysia (MYS)*	9535000	1207	12.658626114
58	Equatorial Guinea (GNQ)	148000	19	12.837837838
59	Cyprus (CYP)	309500	40	12.924071082
60	Israel (ISR)*	2422300	317	13.086735747
61	Algeria (DZA)	6228772	831	13.341313504
62	Slovenia (SVN)*	914000	122	13.347921225
63	Maldives (MDV)	86246	12	13.913688751
64	Bahrain (BHR)	157400	22	13.977128335
65	Saudi Arabia (SAU)	5808617	829	14.271899834
66	Seychelles (SYC)	33110	5	15.101177892
67	Netherlands Antilles (ANT)	52237	8	15.314815169
68	Tunisia (TUN)	2704900	425	15.71222596
69	Bermuda (BMU)	37597	6	15.958720111
70	US Virgin Islands (VIR)	42550	7	16.451233843
71	Bahamas (BHS)	144360	24	16.625103907
72	Egypt (EGY)	17556700	2942	16.757135453
73	South Africa (ZAF)*	11335000	1908	16.832818703
74	Sri Lanka (LKA)	6212400	1057	17.01435838
75	Puerto Rico (PRI)	1150000	196	17.043478261
76	Yemen (YEM)	3621679	639	17.643750316
77	Mongolia (MNG)	832300	147	17.661900757
78	Anguilla (AIA)	5644	1	17.717930546
79	Barbados (BRB)	128800	23	17.857142857
80	Trinidad and Tobago (TTO)	514100	92	17.895351099
81	Uruguay (URY)*	1076200	195	18.119308679
82	Mauritius (MUS)	490800	90	18.337408313
83	Syria (SYR)	4844020	889	18.352525382
84	Fiji (FJI)	114300	21	18.372703412
85	Venezuela (VEN)*	9404600	1735	18.448418859
86	Pakistan (PAK)*	36847000	6800	18.45469102
87	Turkey (TUR)*	20367000	3776	18.539794766

88	Philippines (PHL)*	30085000	5594	18.593983713
89	Indonesia (IDN)*	90807000	16931	18.645038378
90	Chile (CHL)*	5479400	1030	18.797678578
91	Dominican Republic (DOM)	2652000	504	19.004524887
92	Argentina (ARG)*	8143400	1554	19.08293833
93	Panama (PAN)*	984200	188	19.101808575
94	Jamaica (JAM)*	942300	181	19.208320068
95	Suriname (SUR)	72834	14	19.22179202
96	Costa Rica (CRI)*	1552900	299	19.254298409
97	Belize (BLZ)	77785	15	19.283923636
98	Mexico (MEX)*	39386000	7630	19.372365815
99	Morocco (MAR)*	9329755	1823	19.539634213
100	Brazil (BRA)*	75458000	14895	19.739457712
101	Oman (OMN)	70486	14	19.862100275
102	Cuba (CUB)	3843000	766	19.932344523
103	El Salvador (SLV)*	2451300	492	20.070982744
104	Peru (PER)*	7619900	1565	20.538327275
105	Colombia (COL)*	16497600	3400	20.609058287
106	Ecuador (ECU)*	3673200	759	20.663181967
107	Thailand (THA)*	33484000	6953	20.76514156
108	Botswana (BWA)	483432	101	20.892286816
109	Honduras (HND)	2334600	489	20.945772295
110	Nicaragua (NIC)	1701700	367	21.566668625
111	Bolivia (BOL)	2096000	470	22.423664122
112	Guatemala (GTM)*	4511600	1018	22.564057097
113	Bangladesh (BGD)*	51764000	11768	22.733946372
114	Zimbabwe (ZWE)	4665449	1097	23.513278143
115	Vietnam (VNM)*	36994000	8900	24.057955344
116	Myanmar (MMR)	18359000	4447	24.222452203
117	Solomon Islands (SLB)	33000	8	24.242424242
118	Cambodia (KHM)	6243329	1572	25.178874924
119	Namibia (NAM)	431849	123	28.482177798

N.B. China, except Hong Kong and Macao.

The Roots and Rise of Neo-conservatism in Japanese Politics: From the Post War to Koizumi

Carlos Ramirez*

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the history and rise of neo-conservative politics in Japan that has now come to dominate the national discourse. For most of the post-war period, Japan's policymakers single-mindedly pursued economic development. To do this, Japan relinquished an independent foreign policy to the USA in exchange for broad American security guarantees. This strategy was called the Yoshida doctrine and was central to the nation's post-war liberal pacifist politics. During this time, however, conservative and neo-conservative politicians have never been far from the center of power. They argue for a renewed sense of pride in Japanese values, a more positive assessment of Japan's war experience and for an assertive diplomacy. With the election of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001, neo-conservatives have seized control of political power and the national narrative. This paper analyzes the factors and causes for the rise of neo-conservative politics in light of a democratic regime change that has favored the movement. This regime change began in the 1980's and is characterized by a shift from a system of elitist politics to one of political pluralism that was precipitated by the emergence of an independent urban voter.

KEYWORDS: Conservative and Neo-conservative Politics, Yoshida Doctrine, Elitist Politics, Political Pluralism, Democratic Regime Transition

Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, the main political and foreign policy debate in Japan has revolved around the legitimacy and efficacy of the nation's constitution. For Japanese neo-conservatives, the constitution is a document written and imposed upon Japan by the American Army following the end of the War and represents victor's justice. They argue that it is time for major constitutional change centered on the idea of "normalization" defined as the right to self defense via a constitutionally sanctioned armed forces. Their opponents, in contrast, believe the Japanese constitution is something to be cherished and preserved despite its

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controversial origins. For them, the constitution has been a formidable pillar in maintaining peace and ensuring prosperity in the country. This debate is reflective of the underlying ideological proclivities among the differing political parties and within each of them. For most of the post-war period, those wishing to retain the current constitution have had the upper hand in the debate against the conservatives and neo-conservatives pursuing change. However, the latter have been in ascendance since the late 1990's and have assumed the top leadership positions within the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The neo-conservative rise to power has distinct roots in domestic politics yet its power has been buttressed by changes in the international security environment. Neo-conservatives have benefitted electorally from the advent of perceived threats of foreign actors, namely China and North Korea, by amplifying their dangers and by appealing to nationalist slogans to confront the emerging external risks.

Neo-conservative politics has a long history in Japan but they have only played a subordinate role to more mainstream ideologies in the corridors of power for most of the nation's modern history. The main purpose of this paper is to examine the roots and rise of neo-conservative politics in Japan since the end of the Second World War. It also asserts that the neo-conservative ascent to power was precipitated by a democratic regime shift occurring in the 1980's. The focus of the paper is on the history of the movement, their leaders and the factors that generated political change that drove the success of neo-conservative political ideas in Japan. The first part of this paper examines the main ideological tenets of neo-conservatism and contrasts them with its predecessor movement, conservatism. The second part of the paper provides an overview of the history of neo-conservatism from the end of the war to Koizumi including the genesis of the movement. It assesses the personal rivalries and political factions vying for power and influence in the government formed immediately after the Second World War. The main leaders of conservatism and neo-conservatism discussed in this paper are the former Prime Ministers Ichiro Hatoyama, Nobusuke Kishi, Yasuhiro Nakasone and Junichiro Koizumi. The final part of the paper concentrates on the context and evolution of the political environment that lead to the rise and capture of power by neo-conservatives. The growing numbers of sophisticated independent voters, the corresponding changes in electoral laws, the decline in the importance and power of the Socialist Party, and the emergence of international pressures all contributed to neo-conservative political supremacy and towards the transformation, not yet complete but well underway, of Japan's political identity. This evolving political context took place within a framework of democratic regime change. The new democratic regime both influenced and was influenced by the numerous political battles and contests that were ongoing at that time. The leaders of the neo-conservative movement have best adapted to the altered political context that has emerged from the new democratic regime.

Japan's democratic regime has been best understood by two competing theories of democracy. They are a developmental state theory versus a theory of patterned pluralism. These theories respectively fall under the two broad categories of democratic theory outlined by Dahl (2000): democratic elitism and democratic pluralism. Democratic elitism posits that political power is held within a powerful

minority of national leaders who wield this power independent of elections. In contrast, in the pluralist theory, which Dahl further refines into the concept of polyarchy, there are numerous diverse and competing groups within society exerting influence on the policy making apparatus in government. The final output conceived by government is reflective of this competition. Indeed, the maintenance of political power by the political party controlling the government is dependent on representing the views of the winners of this competition or risk the loss of power via elections. The most influential exponent of the democratic elitist theory in the Japanese context is Chalmers Johnson (1982). In his seminal study of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), he refers to Japan as a developmental state governed by an elite group of bureaucrats in alliance with political leaders and large corporations. This group known as the Iron Triangle coalition spearheaded Japan's drive for economic growth in the 1950's and 1960's.

An alternative explanation of Japan's democratic regime was later developed by Muramatsu and Krauss (1987) and Calder (1988). These theories fall under the rubric of democratic pluralism or in Dahl's terms polyarchy. Calder argues that the LDP, for reasons of self-preservation, has habitually responded to the demands of diverse political groups particularly during periods of economic crisis. Calder described Japan's state-society relationship as a recurring loop of societal crisis followed by state compensation in the form of financial or public aid to alleviate social crisis. These state compensatory measures result from intense societal pressure for public assistance. Along similar lines, Muramatsu and Krauss observed that Japanese democracy has two aspects to it. First, a pluralistic side that offers wide access to numerous competing interest groups. These groups are seen to successfully exert influence symbolized by the high degree of government responsiveness to their demands. Secondly, a patterned aspect in which the access to government has been institutionalized through close ties of interest groups to the respective bureaucratic agency and politicians who oversee their area of concern. These ties allow the powerholders to shape and control policy more than would be the case under a purer form of pluralism. Thus, Muramatsu and Krauss use the term patterned pluralism to characterize Japan's democratic regime.

Yet, as Berger (2007) notes, both of these explanations are possible if viewed over time. He argues that the elitist Iron Triangle democratic regime of the 1950's and 1960's gave way to a more competitive, pluralistic one towards the end of the twentieth century. In the immediate aftermath of the war, as Johnson explains, Japan was characterized by a centralized decision making apparatus. This was followed, however, in the 1980's by a system resembling more Calder's or Muramatsu and Krauss' theories of Japan in which political parties, politicians and the Diet strengthened their oversight over policymaking and output at the expense of bureaucrats. At the same time, interest groups, private associations and individual voters increased their influence and independence while entering into competition with each other over access to the government decision-making process. The state under this type of democratic regime became much more attuned to voters' desires. Japanese politicians have been forced to act on, and react to, the demands of these numerous and increasingly autonomous societal groups.

This paper broadly concurs with Berger's timeline of democratic transition outlined above. In addition, the transition provides the framework within which the protagonists involved in the conservative and neo-conservative movements evolve. Interestingly, it has been conservative leaders who have adapted and benefitted most from political change. Ultimately in the early 2000's, they are able to wrest control of power from those political leaders who had monopolized the national discourse since the end of the Second World War. This post-war narrative consisted of a singular focus on domestic economic development and a non-assertive foreign policy that upheld and sustained the pacifist constitution. It was the mainstream and pervasive ideology of Japan throughout the second half of the twentieth century.

As Oros (2017) maintains, however, the pacifist narrative has slowly changed as a result of neo-conservative political success. All current political parties in Japan, with public acquiescence, have reached a broad consensus on a number of new national policies and priorities that were previously endorsed only by political groups on the far right end of the political spectrum. This neo-conservative narrative argues for a proactive security and foreign policy combined with a more robust image of Japan by both its own citizens and those of other countries. For Oros, this new consensus represents a partial yet ongoing transformation, or renaissance in his words, of the Japanese identity that previously advocated anti-militarism to one emphasizing national pride and assertive diplomacy. It is a rebirth of ideology, priorities and policies that has its origin in the Meiji era.

Indeed, Japanese neo-conservative politics begin with the conservative intellectual thought that imbued much of the Meiji era. At its core, the goal of the Meiji period was the restoration of values and traditions that were prevalent under the Imperial system, albeit restrained by a new quasi-democratic polity. As Swale (2009) observes, conservatism during Meiji was split into two camps. One camp prioritized industrialization and bureaucratic rationalization (Swale, 2009, p. 12). The other emphasized a traditional social order centered on the Imperial household and its conservative values (Swale, 2009). These two blocs were the precursors to the two post-war political ideologies within the LDP, the party that has dominated Japanese politics for the past 70 years. In pre-war times, the former camp initially controlled power and is credited for the extraordinary transformation of Japan during the early Meiji era turning Japan from an agricultural society and technologically backward inward-looking nation into a modern industrializing country. However, the latter camp was able to wrest power from the Meiji visionaries at the turn of the nineteenth century. The hubris and overconfidence of these leaders in the second camp propelled Japan down a path of destruction, devastation and military defeat in 1945. In the post-World War II era, history has repeated itself. After a long period of playing a secondary role to the heirs of the former (i.e., Yoshida and his followers) who oversaw Japan's soaring economic rise, the successors of the second camp (i.e., the neo-conservatives) have now taken over the reins of power at the start of the twenty-first century.

Neo-Conservative Ideology

According to Takahashi (2007), neo-conservatives can be distinguished from their predecessor conservative brethren in two ways. First, the neo-conservatives of this generation idealize Japan's pre-war period and loathe the pacifist traditions of post-war Japan (Takahashi, 2007). They completely repudiate the positions and arguments made by those who support an anti-military ideology such as the members of the Socialist party and pacifist groups. The new generation was born during or after the war and did not experience the hardships of war. Neo-conservatives blame Japan's present international security weakness on pacifist groups, as opposed to conservatives who mainly blamed the US. They also glorify Japan's prewar military strength and prowess. Yet, they do not subscribe to an irredentist nationalism in which Japan would use force to reacquire Takeshima, the Senkaku Islands or the Kuriles (Mochizuki, 2007).

Second, according to Takahashi (2007), the current generation of neo-conservatives hold a dual position of a pro-US stance together with an anti-China stance, although the ultimate goal is a foreign policy independent of the US. This is different from the older conservatives who viewed autonomy and security separation from the US as a goal to be achieved immediately. Older conservatives also viewed China more pragmatically as a partner, one that required both flexible diplomacy as well as tough negotiating tactics. In contrast, the neo-conservatives stance toward China can be characterized as a hard-line, non-concessional one (Takahashi, 2007). However, current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a neo-conservative, has hued of late to a more conservative policy towards China as international real politick compels such a stance. On the issue of constitutional change, conservatives argued for a complete overhaul or erasure of Article 9, which abolishes the use of force to resolve international disputes, whereas neo-conservatives are resigned to more incremental or ambiguous changes to the meaning of the terms contained within Article 9.

Finally, Japanese neo-conservatives, unlike their conservative predecessors, have more confidence and place more emphasis on individual liberty and responsibility (Lindgren, 2012). Koizumi's call for the development of the individual, and rewards for these efforts, is indicative of his libertarian streak (Lindgren, 2012). Older conservatives, on the other hand, were more in the Burkean mold of conservatism which values social cohesion alongside individual freedom (Winkler, 2011). For this type of conservative, as Brooks (2007) explains, "the individual is a part of a social organism and thrives only within the attachments to family, community and nation" (para. 11). For post-war conservative politicians such as Hatoyama and Kishi, a preservation of the "national essence" consisting of the centralization of power, loyalty to authority, public order and social cohesion was paramount (Calder, 1988) and symbolic of the more traditional type of conservatism.

On purely domestic policy, conservatives were in general in agreement with other mainstream politicians of their era on the structure of government and their economic growth policies. The emphasis was on stability and order. In contrast, neo-conservatives want to transform government to create a new growth model. To do this, they need to undermine the vested interests that supported the past system.

Stated differently, conservatives in the immediate post-war period felt comfortable working within the iron triangle of politics, bureaucracy and big business to advance an agenda of national economic development from the top down. Conversely, neo-conservatives want to create a governing regime from the bottom up (Winkler, 2011). They are initiating economic and political reforms that reflect and favor the increasing strength of new urban independent voters to directly garner their support. These policies are a mix of privatization, market-opening and deregulation combined with more interventionist fiscal and monetary policies. In this way, the neo-conservatives have become the “reformers” of contemporary Japan (Takeuchi, 2016). Their economic policies can be differentiated with neo-conservatives in the West who dogmatically support in excess *laissez-faire* free market policies. Japanese neo-conservatives are more pragmatic in their choice of economic policy emphasizing the free market yet open to other policies including interventionist (i.e., populist) ones that will increase their electoral prospects.

To be sure, conservatives and neo-conservatives share common ground on many issues of politics and history. They both express strong patriotic pride and belief in the righteousness of Japan’s behavior during the War. For them, the conflict was about a war of liberation - not one of aggression. Those who fought and made the ultimate sacrifice should be honored, remembered and celebrated annually at shrines such as Yasukuni where many of their spirits are enshrined. For conservatives and neo-conservative alike, War time abuses and transgressions such as the massacres at Nanking or the abuse of Asian women during the war are exaggerations or distortions of the truth. Education and textbooks should reflect a more virtuous image of the nation’s history and politics. It is the state’s obligation to ensure the latter through educational reform and strict oversight of content and curriculum.

The Origins of LDP Conservative Movement

As Curtis (2013) notes, Japan’s politics has been consistent in its main goals since the Meiji period beginning in 1868. Japan has had to ensure its own survival in an international system created and dominated by others eschewing any illusions of a global or even regional *pax japonica*. The only exception was, as noted above, the period of conquest and war in Asia between 1910 and 1944. However, precisely as a result of this tragic and painful experience, the Japanese body politic after the war returned to its initial Meiji roots of seeking accommodation within the international system governed by greater powers. Post-war Japan rejected the nationalist irredentist goals of the 1910 to 1944 period. Yet, notwithstanding the return to a defensive posture after the war, the lingering influence of Japanese imperial conservatism that characterized political leadership during the war period remained embedded in the nation’s politics throughout the second half of the twentieth century and, indeed, not infrequently rose to the fore of domestic and foreign policy debates.

Since the war, however, the pragmatic tenets of the Yoshida doctrine have dominated Japanese politics despite the strong undercurrents of conservatism. The doctrine was named after Shigeru Yoshida who served as prime minister for most of

the critical war transition years between 1946 and 1954. It consisted mainly of Japan playing a subordinate and supporting role of American foreign policy. In exchange for its acquiescence, Japan was granted American defense guarantees that afforded economic space for domestic reconstruction and development. As Curtis (2013) explains, even Yoshida himself was surprised by the enduring nature of his doctrine. He expected that his subservient pacifist policy would be abandoned once Japan had achieved significant economic development (Curtis, 2013). Throughout the post-war period, the strong undertones of conservative thought inside the governing LDP would occasionally gain preeminence among top policy-making figures, including the holder of the Prime Ministership. These episodes tested the resilience of the doctrine but it was never able to overturn it.

The origins of the doctrine lie in the era of the immediate aftermath of the war when Yoshida was head of the governing Liberal Party. At the time, Japan's political system was under the watchful eye of the American office of Supreme Command for Allied Powers (SCAP). He assumed the post of prime minister with little competition, the product of an American purge of his rivals as many of them had either lent political support to the military regime during the war or were directly involved with it. While his party and policies can be characterized as conservative in nature, they were essentially pragmatic in outlook. In fact, Yoshida willingly subscribed to a policy of subordination under American hegemony (Gordon, 2014). Yoshida used the restrictions imposed by the United States through Article 9 of the constitution to limit Japan's participation in America's more extreme military adventurism (Dower, 2012).

Facing off against Yoshida were two groups. One was led by Ichiro Hatoyama who headed an opposition from the right within the party and the other was the Socialist Party from the left. Hatoyama can be viewed as the father of post-war conservative and neo-conservative politics of Japan. Hatoyama, who was an ambitious politician with desires to become prime minister himself, grew frustrated with Yoshida's diffident policies vis-à-vis the Americans (Silverman, (2013). Hatoyama was a purgee who supported Japanese aggression in Asia and the suppression of dissent in Japan during the war (Dower, 2012). He was barred from politics from 1946 until 1951 when he made his return to the Liberal Party. In 1954, Hatoyama bolted from the Liberal party with a number of his followers and joined the Democratic Party a centrist-conservative party led by Takeo Miki. Hatoyama was incensed over Yoshida's refusal to relinquish his long tenure as Prime Minister as well as the general direction of the government (Silverman, 2013).

With the backing of the Socialists, Hatoyama was able to oust Yoshida from power and become Prime Minister himself in 1954. With only a plurality of seats in the Diet and facing a unified Socialist opposition, the Democrats and Liberals merged to form a stable majority government (Dower, 2012; Gordon 2014). The newly created Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) would remain in power for most of the next 60 years and became the foundation of the "1955 system." The other main components of the system included the Socialist Party as opposition party, the business elite and the bureaucracy. The LDP/Socialist Party political axis constituted the core of the political party system. The pacifist Socialists, espousing a command economy and opposing rearmament under any circumstances, was forsaken to

perennial opposition status. The business elite and the bureaucracy together with the LDP formed the triumvirate of power that governed the nation for the remainder of the century.

While much of the dispute between Yoshida and Hatoyama was over personality differences and the spoils of power, there was also real disagreement concerning policy. These political disputes between the two early post-war leaders framed the debate over security policy for the next six decades. Present day conservative-minded politicians and opinion makers are the direct political heirs of either Yoshida or Hatoyama. Yoshida was a conservative Realist and a pragmatic as he understood the limits placed on his government by the occupying forces. As Dower (2012), explains, Yoshida and his cabinet essentially advocated for “an unarmed nation dedicated to restoring peaceful relations with the rest of the world including China and the Soviet Union” (p. 192). During his tenure, however, under pressure from the Americans, Yoshida introduced and passed a bill creating the Self Defense Forces. Yet, Yoshida was reticent to spend scarce resources on the SDF given his focus on rejuvenating the economy (Silverman, 2013).

Hatoyama, in contrast, who represented the conservative hawkish wing of the party, was suspicious and skeptical of the occupation and the American imposed constitution. He espoused a Japan militarily capable of acting independently of the US. As Silverman (2013) notes, the Democratic Party under Hatoyama was an ideological movement comprising of conservative nationalists who were strongly opposed to the Yoshida Doctrine.

They believed that the SCAP had been wrong to marginalize the emperor and that Japan must be able to conduct foreign policy on its own terms. To achieve this, conservatives felt that Japan must revise the constitution and Mutual Security Treaty (MST) as well as pursue peaceful relations with the Communist bloc. Although the Democrats were fervent anti-Communists, they felt that Japan must not limit its options in the region simply because of American desires (Silverman, 2012, para. 13).

Unlike Yoshida, Hatoyama was in favor of rearmament but not for the same reasons that the Americans were advocating. He viewed rearmament as a means of escape from an American embrace in order to chart an independent path (Dower, 2012). Remilitarization would reduce Japan’s subordination to American dictates and allow Japan to formulate its own foreign policy. Hatoyama’s main aims were to unambiguously make the Emperor head of state and to abolish Article 9 of the constitution (Gordon, 2014). Indeed, in 1956 when he was Prime Minister and on his recommendation, the Diet approved the creation of a committee to review the constitution (Gordon, 2014). Hatoyama yearned for a more assertive and autonomous Japan able to conduct its politics and foreign policy free of American interference.

The Yoshida- Hatoyama debate has continued until the present day passed on through the different factions of the LDP. However, the moderate Yoshida wing of the party, also known as *hoshu honryu* in Japanese, has always held supremacy over the general direction of national priorities. It was able to do this by consolidating a coalition of public and private interests around a policy emphasizing national

economic growth and development. Even though a number of Prime Ministers and politicians, most notably the conservative Nobusuku Kishi in the late 1950's, envisioned a rearmed Japan under a revised and amended constitution, conservatives in the Hatoyama mold were constrained by this Yoshida-minded coalition of interests. As Prime Minister, Kishi was successful in implementing some measures of the conservative agenda. His main accomplishments included a revised US Japan security treaty that intended to put Japan on an equal footing with the US. He was also able to restore limited diplomatic independence for Japan. Finally, although he was unable to amend the constitution, he began the practice of reinterpreting Article 9 and expanded its meaning to include the rearmament of the SDF for defensive purposes. However, because of intra-party politics of the LDP, the centrist pragmatic factions always retained a preeminent role supported by their constituency both inside and outside the Diet (Takahashi, 2010). They were able to restrain any major shifts in security and defense policy. For much of the post-war period, MITI acted as a pilot agency guiding and cementing this coalition of stakeholders (Mochizuka, 2007). In the case of Kishi, large protests and demonstrations against his moves to strengthen Japan's security ultimately lead to his resignation in 1960. Yet, the conservative wing of the LDP never strayed far from power and maintained a formidable presence within the party albeit in a minority position. As Mochizuki (2007) notes, "total defeat in World War II did not wipe away Japan's strong sense of national identity" (pg. 9).

It wasn't until Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1982 that another conservative politician was able to retake the reins of power albeit within a Yoshida-centric political framework. He understood this well and realized his limits to making changes in overall policy directions (Winkler, 2011). He managed this delicate policy balance by, on the one hand, challenging the pacifist constitution and insisting on making amendments to it, although ultimately failing to do so. On the other hand, Nakasone introduced the concept of *kokusai kouken* (international contribution) which emphasized Japan's role as a responsible member of the global community. Japan as a positive contributor to international issues would open more its domestic markets to foreign products and investments, allow in more immigration and foreign workers, compile a larger international aid budget, and finally be more receptive to international culture symbolized by an effort to improve the English language ability of the Japanese people (Mochizuki, 2007).

Under the guise of *kokusai kouken*, Nakasone also added a security to element to Japan's renewed interest in international affairs. Henceforth, Japan would be an active supporter of the maintenance of international peace which in turn meant there was a need to substantially upgrade its military capabilities. Thus, Nakasone proceeded to remove the one percent defense budget limit that was in place at that time and embarked on a program of military buildup called the Mid Term Defense Estimates (Tsuchiyama, 2007). Nakasone's constitutional controversies and military increases were tempered by the fact that he worked closely with his American counterparts and, indeed, argued that these new policy changes were necessary to both uphold its commitments to the American security alliance and as a demonstration of Japan's good global citizenship. In this way, he remained within the *hoshu honryu* policy context.

Successor neo-conservatives have used this “Nakasone paradox”, which combines good global citizenship with a more assertive strategic stance in partnership with the United States, to further its ambitions of ultimately achieving more autonomy. As Mochizuki (2007) explains, “Japanese conservative leaders realized that it would be better to work with the United States rather than against the United States to enhance Japan’s voice and maneuverability in international affairs” (pg. 12). This strategy can also be seen under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his relationship with the Obama Administration. For example, his close adherence to overall American security strategy permitted Abe to carve out an independent Japanese policy on Russia despite the friction in US-Russian relations. Even some soft conservatives such as Ichiro Ozawa, a one-time powerful member of the LDP, argued that Japan needed to amend Article 9 in order to effectively participate in UN Peacekeeping initiatives. Such an amendment would also help instances of collective defense and thereby demonstrate Japan’s commitment to international peace. In this way, the argument in favor of constitutional change became linked to *kokusai kouken* (Tsuchiyama, 2007), yet remained within the parameters of the Yoshida Doctrine.

Nakasone was also the first politician to intuitively understand that Japan’s democracy and politics were changing and attempted to reach out to the new independent urban vote that was gaining electoral strength (Otake, 2011). He was hoping to expand the LDP urban political base by appealing to them through market deregulation. Nakasone sought the relaxation of the Large Retail Store Regulation Law and the liberalization of the rice market (Otake, 2011) which would result in more product choice at lower prices for urban consumers. These moves and other market reforms initially backfired as rural voters *en masse* defected to the Socialist Party giving them victory in the 1989 Upper House election (Otake, 2011) since the voting system was still heavily biased towards lightly populated rural areas. Despite these failed efforts to attract new voters, Nakasone was careful not to go too far in upsetting the coalition established by the LDP mainstream and overseen by MITI. Still, Nakasone was a man before his time as he laid the electoral strategy groundwork for later neo-conservatives to exploit the new voting patterns once reformed electoral laws were in place.

The decade of the 1990’s was a tumultuous period of politics which saw a historic albeit short lived transfer of power from the LDP to a coalition government led by Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in 1993. This transition was preceded by a split in the LDP when former LDP General Secretary and political heavy weight Ichiro Ozawa left the party. Ozawa was the principal mover and intellectual anchor behind the coalition government. However, in fighting among the different members of the coalition led to its downfall in 1994. It was replaced by a government lead by Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama and backed by the LDP. For the Socialists, this led to the beginning of their demise as their supporters became disillusioned with the political and ideological compromises made by the party. During the decade, a confluence of political, economic and social factors in both domestic and international spheres engendered a climate ripe for political change. It was propelled by an independent electoral block in urban areas amplified by modifications in the electoral laws. The electoral veer towards neo-conservatism among the populace was also indicative of the transformation of the democratic

system that commenced in the 1980's. The system evolved from one solely governed by an elitist coalition towards one that is responsive to new, diverse interests outside this coalition.

The Rise of Neo-Conservatives

It was not until the turn of the century that conservative forces inside the LDP would gain the upper hand. The election of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001 was a tipping point and represented a break with the previous 1955 system. It was a fundamental regime shift propelled domestically by a realignment of political parties, Japan's waning economic clout and the transformation of the public policy-making process (Pempel, 2007). Also driving change were external forces including the end of the Cold War, the two Gulf Wars and the emergence of external challenges coming from an increasingly powerful China and a potentially nuclear armed North Korea. To be sure, the transformation while dramatic was of an evolutionary nature beginning in the late 1980's instigated by an urbanized population insisting upon electoral reform. Ironically, these reforms backfired on the short-lived non-LDP coalition government of 1993 even though they were the initiators and implementers of these new legislative actions.

The regime transformation was characterized by a shift from the elitist democratic model of politics to one of political pluralism, or polyarchy in Dahl's terms, in which political parties and politicians act and react on behalf of diverse societal interests. Berger (2007) suggests this transition took place between the 1960's and 1970's. This author would argue it occurred slightly later during the 1980's. In the previous elitist model that continued until 1980's, Japanese politics were controlled by a few actors: elite politicians, the bureaucracy and the executives of large corporate conglomerates. In the new post-1980's model, the power balance has shifted to politicians who must seek the favor of disparate voting populations and competing interest groups. These groups include the corporate and bureaucratic interests who were prevalent under the previous model. But, they also now include other societal groups such as the increasingly powerful and sophisticated urban electorate (Tanaka, 2012; Kohno, 2007). All of these groups are at once making demands and competing for influence while at the same time being influenced by political leaders and the media who support the ideology of certain leaders (Yamamura & Sabatini, 2014). For reasons to be explained below, the more conservative voices within the LDP have been best positioned to profit most from the new form of competitive politics.

Factors Towards the Turn to Neo Conservatism

There are numerous factors for the ascendance of neo-conservative politicians to the highest positions of power beginning with Koizumi's election as prime minister in 2001, followed by Shinzo Abe, Taro Aso and, then later, once again by Abe. Many of these factors originate during the democratic transition period of the

1980's and 1990's, including the important electoral reforms implemented by the non-LDP coalition government of Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa in 1993. These changes in the electoral system allowed candidates to rely less on factional support and more on appealing directly to the electorate which favored populist candidates espousing nationalist policies (Pempel, 2007). Populist and charismatic politicians benefitted from the rising numbers of urban independent voters who were previously instrumental in the election of the Hosokawa government. Conservative-populists proposals for economic reform and a more assertive foreign policy stance combined with appeals to nationalist/nativist symbols such as visits to Yasukuni shrine, stroke a chord with these voters.

The new electoral system also contributed to the demise of the Socialist Party which was the main bastion of support for pacifist foreign policies since the War. The new electoral rules forced parties to expand their appeal among a broader base of the electorate within each voting constituency as the system moved from a multi-seat to a single seat, first-past-the-post system (Kohno, 2007). This in effect was a winner take all system which meant the broader the appeal, the higher the possibility of election. In 1994, the Socialists under Tomiichi Murayama made the decision to abandon their pacifist positions that argued against the constitutionality of both the US-Japan Security treaty and the Self Defense Forces. This decision was made in an attempt to attract more mainstream voters to their platform as many voters viewed these positions as far too idealistic. This had two impacts that favored neo-conservatives. First, the mainstreaming of Socialist Party policy reduced the differentiation between the Socialists and the LDP. This meant the vanishing of political opposition to a more assertive stance on security issues. As Kohno (2007) explains, "Having to face the JSP as the largest opposition in the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, the governing LDP had thus been pressured not to deviate from foreign policies that limited Japan's role in bilateral defense with the United States and restrained Japan from taking assertive diplomatic initiatives" (pg. 40).

Secondly, and a corollary to the latter, with no opposition to a more assertive defense policy, a domestic consensus began to form around security issues more in accordance with neo-conservative positions (Kohno, 2007). In sum, supporters of the Socialist Party's felt betrayed after the party abandoned many of its core principles. Without an established party to act as a constraint on conservative forces within the LDP, sentiment on security policy among the general public shifted to the right (Pempel, 2007).

Direct appeals to voters for popular support in turn have empowered elected politicians and, most significantly, enhanced the power of the prime minister vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. Following new legislation in 1999, for the first time the prime minister's office under Koizumi began to initiate and shape policy. The Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) was symbolic of the new power of politicians over the bureaucracy. Koizumi entrusted the CEFP to spearhead his structural reforms of government and society and made it answer directly to the cabinet and Prime Minister bypassing the relevant ministries (Shinoda, 2013). The professional bureaucracy was relegated to an advisory role and to that of implementer of policy (Pempel, 2007). This was a dramatic reversal of the

policy-making system. Since the War, it was principally the bureaucracy in consultation with politicians and business that took the lead in formulating policy.

One final significant outcome of the new electoral system in which the Prime Minister became the face of the party to voters was its impact on the internal politics of the LDP. As power became more centralized in the hands of the leaders, party members were forced to toe the leadership line and hence the diversity of opinions diminished. Previously, the jockeying for power among the different factions naturally led to a consensus decision making process as each faction would offer concessions to reach a satisfactory agreement (Nakano, 2014). Under the new regime, the consensus seeking environment was replaced by the outsized influence of neo-conservatives who assumed leadership positions within the party (Nakano, 2014). This dynamic was captured by the diminution of power among more moderates within the LDP such as Koichi Kato, Kiichi Miyazawa and Yohei Kono who subscribed to quintessentially Yoshida-like platforms that focused on economic development and a more subdued foreign policy (Pempel, 2007). The demise in influence of these three key politicians, as well as Ryutaro Hashimoto's Heisei Kenyu-kai LDP faction, spurred the conservative consolidation of power within the LDP. Lastly, the demise of the Socialist Party together with the splintering of the LDP in the 1990's following the departure of Ichiro Ozawa and other moderates to form a new party also had the impact of leaving the remaining conservatives of the LDP with a strengthened hand inside the party.

On the economic side, Japan's post-bubble financial decline from 1990 to 2010 coupled with the rise of other Asian economies particularly that of China shook the nation's confidence. This fostered a siege mentality within the country in the 1990's providing an opening for the rise of politicians with alternatives ideas. As mentioned earlier, it was the neo-conservatives under Koizumi's leadership (and under subsequent neo-conservative leaders such as Abe) who carried the flag of reformism. They promoted privatization and deregulation as well as fresh ideas such as the empowerment of women in society and the workforce. As the recession dragged on in the 1990's, disgruntled independent urban voters were willing to give these new ideas and leaders a chance even if there were a dislike for some of the more assertive security postures they proposed.

The changing international environment at the end of the Cold War also provided an abrupt and serious challenge to Japan's defense complacency a product of the American security umbrella under which Japan existed. As Japan reached its height of economic success in the late 1980's, the Cold War ended and some in the American media, academia and political world came to view Japan as the new global threat at least in the economic sphere (see, for example, Friedman and Lebard, 1991 or Prestowitz, 1990). The demise of the Soviet Union left the US-Japan alliance without a common enemy and led to a questioning of the nature and value of the alliance. There was resentment in the US concerning Japan's security free ride. There was a perception by some in the US that Japan was reaping economic benefits at the expense of Americans. Rising American complaints against Japan because it was not "paying its fair share" coupled with Japan's enormous trade surplus and large conspicuous investments in the US, resulted in Japan "bashing" and a general weakening of the alliance.

In 1991, the first Gulf War and Japan's checkbook response to it heightened the pressure from Washington for Japan to assume greater global security responsibilities. Politicians in the mold of Hatoyama-like conservatives such as Shintaro Ishihara responded with indignity to the criticisms coming out of the US. They urged Japanese leaders to forcefully answer these critics and to display greater independence from US foreign policy. In contrast, mainstream politicians as well as neo-conservatives favored a conciliatory approach that emphasized a tightening of the alliance between the US and Japan. Indeed, the Japanese government's response to the Gulf War included dispatching minesweepers to the Gulf and, as a contribution to regional stability, the sending of the SDF on a peacekeeping mission to Cambodia. These new security initiatives were unprecedented for Japan. For Japanese liberal politicians, they were a way of demonstrating a willingness to contribute to global peace. Neo-conservatives, however, viewed these new measures as an opening to press for a more muscular strategic stance albeit in conjunction with the US.

China's military expansion beginning in earnest in the 1990's as well as its more aggressive actions in the South and East China Seas exacerbated fears among the public and gave additional credence to neo-conservative views for a better militarily equipped Japan. Similarly, North Korea's ambitions to possess nuclear weapons further buttressed their positions. The events on September 11th, the second Gulf War and the war on terrorism all resulted in a slow but sure weakening and dilution of Japan's pacifist stance and, hence, of the Yoshida Doctrine, which had remained at the center of government policy since the end of WWII. Koizumi and other neo-conservatives who succeeded him used all of these external challenges to implement new and unprecedented security measures (Buszynski, 2006).

Koizumi himself authored legislation that saw for the first time the dispatch of naval units, two destroyers and a supply ship to the Indian Ocean to assist in the transport of fuel and other supplies for US and allied navies during the US war in Afghanistan in 2001. He also obtained Diet approval for the War Contingency Bills in 2003. This allowed Japan to deploy forces abroad in the event of a military emergency. Under the legislation, it permitted him to send 1,100 SDF to Samawah in Southern Iraq during the war there (Buszynski, 2006). This action became a watershed event in Japan security policy paving the way for future neo-conservatives such as Abe to cement Japan's new pro-active approaches to defense and foreign policy.

Concluding Remarks and Koizumi's Successors

In the Post World War II era, conservative political thought has never been far from the halls of power or from the center of the Japanese psyche. However, until the rise of Koizumi in 2001, Japan's painful experiences of the war and its sense of contrition, subjugated conservative thought to a second rung of politics. In place of the nationalist conservative thought that had imbued Japan prior to and during the war, mainstream politicians after the war opted for a one track mind in the pursuit of economic growth. It was this thinking that monopolized the positions of power throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and came to be known as the

Yoshida doctrine. The doctrine functioned within a framework of democratic elitist politics in which an iron-clad triangle of political leaders, bureaucrats and big business shared the levers of power. It also engendered one of the most remarkable periods of high growth with equity of any country in history - an impressive economic miracle matched by few other countries (Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976; Johnson 1982).

During the early period of post-war high growth, Hatoyama and Kishi carried the flag of conservatism advocating for a return to an independent domestic and foreign policy free of US influence. For this to happen, they favored wholesale changes to the constitution. In general, conservatives urged for a return to pre-war traditional nativist values centered on the Emperor and not on popular sovereignty. In the belief that power should be concentrated at the top echelons of government, they made common cause with more mainstream politicians in keeping the policy decision-making process within an iron triangle of top politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders. Conservatives, like their more mainstream counterparts, also believed in a national industrial strategy of development devised and lead by this coalition of leaders.

A third conservative, Nakasone, reached the premiership in the 1980's and was an immediate precursor to the rise of neo-conservatives such as Koizumi. He blended ideology and policies of both conservatives and neo-conservatives. He also believed in a more muscular strategic stance like his previous conservative counterparts. However, he parted ways with them on their views concerning the US-Japan alliance. He effusively supported Japan's security treaty with the United States. Indeed, he believed it needed to be strengthened and upgraded through revisions or reinterpretations of the constitution. On the domestic side, he opted for new free market ideas on the economy such as deregulation and the opening up of less competitive sectors of the economy (Otake, 2011). These new measures would become the economic calling card for future neo-conservatives. Nakasone's objective was to reach out and capture a new but increasingly powerful voting block: the independent urban voter. He intuited that Japan was undergoing a social and political transition. The nation was moving towards a system of pluralist politics characterized by the emergence of other interest groups outside the traditional ones of big business and the bureaucrats. Political leaders, henceforth, would have to acknowledge, recognize and respond to the demands of these new groups if they were to maintain power.

It was not only conservatives who attempted to attract new independent voters. Other more liberal political reformists also sought to garner their support. But, their actions in many instances had the opposite effect. For instance, Ozawa's defection from the LDP to form a more progressive party weakened the hand of the Yoshida-minded liberal politicians inside the Party. Also, the new party's electoral reforms ultimately favored neo-conservative populists at the expense of more moderate LDP members and the Socialist Party. The latter party has all but vanished from the political scene. In parallel, the international context further reinforced the positions of the neo-conservatives. The end of the Cold War, the Gulf Wars and the security threats coming from China and North Korea all justified and supported their arguments for constitutional amendments, a beefed-up military and a proactive

security stance. In sum, the decline of pragmatic centralist figures within the LDP, the collapse of the Socialist Party and the eclipse of the bureaucracy, three of the most important moderating elements of the political system, altered the underlying political consensus around the Yoshida doctrine and precipitated the rise of a new nationalistic and neo-conservative cadres inside the LDP represented first represented by Koizumi and then by his successor Abe.

Koizumi and his successor neo-conservatives both within and outside the LDP now monopolize the political and social discourse of the nation. They promote domestic policies of deregulation, privatization, market reform and more open trade in order to appeal to urban independent voters. Neo-conservatives have adapted well to a new political regime that reflects and recognizes the demands of the different competing groups in society. One of their secrets to success has been their astute manipulation of the media through direct appeals to the public acknowledging their aspirations for reform of the domestic economy and body politic. In doing so, neo-conservatives have created an organic bottom-up political connection with these voters. They complement this symbiotic relationship with appeals to traditional values such as pride in nation and a revisionist history of Japan as liberator during the war and then as victim of it. In addition, their manipulation of the public's fears concerning the security threats from China and North Korea gives them latitude to implement their assertive foreign and defense policies. Indeed, they demand constitutional change as a necessary condition for Japan to maintain and strengthen its US alliance commitments in order to contain the threat from China and North Korea. Finally, they believe a strong security posture will permit Japan to project power and diplomatic influence around the globe echoing imperial glories of the past.

Neo-conservative contemporaries such as Abe, Aso, Shigeru Ishiba and Seiko Noda within the LDP and Toru Hashimoto and Yuriko Koike outside the LDP now dominate the national political narrative. Yet, like their predecessors (i.e., Koizumi and Nakasone), they have been careful to emphasize their domestic agenda for reform while advocating more quietly and less candidly for their positions on constitutional change and international affairs. Indeed, Abe as Prime Minister has pragmatically blended pro-market policies with more interventionist fiscal and monetary policies. To his credit, these policies have achieved much success and underpin his popularity and staying power. In international affairs, Abe has belatedly taken a more conciliatory tone on history and relations with China and South Korea after a bellicose start to his premiership. His proposals for constitutional amendments have also softened. He no longer publicly supports wholesale changes of Article 9 and only recommends an amendment recognizing the SDF. For now, this strategy of emphasizing political and economic reform over contentious constitutional and security changes seems to be a winning strategy. However, if other political groups fail to create their own narrative of domestic reform, it is only a matter of time before the public will acquiesce to more assertive neo-conservative positions on security and defense.

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ISSN 2432-2938 (Online)

