Formation and Reformation of the Frame as the Platform of a Public Private Partnership: A Case Study of the Project for Community Empowerment after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995

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**Abstract**

The purpose of our research is to illustrate a qualitative change in a Public Private Partnership (PPP) (Skelcher, 2005, p. 347) for disaster recovery with use of frame analysis (Snow, et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988) that developed from the field of social movement theory, through a longitudinal case study. In this research we placed our focus on the frames underlying the PPP in question, which was launched in order to facilitate the recovery of areas devastated by the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995. We employed a sociological approach - such as discourse analysis - as a method to analyze this process, and put more emphasis on the cognitive aspects of key actors engaged in implementing the PPP. The interviews with key actors were conducted in order to collect qualitative data. Based on this, we attempted to elucidate 1) who projected a frame for disaster recovery to whom, 2) how this frame was accepted and how it reflected on both public policy and the PPP implementing this public policy for disaster recovery, and 3) how both public policy and the PPP were institutionalized, and co-evolved with organizations undertaking the PPP while the frame was achieving legitimacy. Finally, we attempted to illustrate a qualitative change in the PPP by revealing how a new frame rose and became the predominant one.

**Keywords:** Frame Analysis, Public Private Partnership, Local Infrastructure Organization

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PURPOSE OF RESEARCH

The purpose of this research is to illustrate a qualitative change in a Public Private Partnership (PPP) (Skelcher, 2005, p. 347) for disaster recovery with use of frame analysis (Snow, et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988), that developed from the field of social movement theory, through a longitudinal case study. In this research we place our focus on the frames underlying the PPP in question which was launched in order to facilitate the recovery of the devastated areas created by the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995. This research intends to expand the discussion based on our previous paper (Yoshida et al., 2011) that described the co-evolutionary process (Baum & Singh, 1994) of organizations and institutions through the same PPP. The previous paper proposed a theoretical contribution to the new institutionalism in organization theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 2001) as well as partnership governance (Davies, 2005; Skelcher et al., 2005). In this paper, we will examine the cognitive aspects of key actors of the PPP, and elucidate the logic of a qualitative change in the PPP through formation and reformation of the partnership frame. In the following section, we review the theoretical framework to analyze this case study.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Previous studies on other PPPs tend to pay more attention to collaborative practices in terms of trust and performance (e.g., Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Bovaird, 2006) or to those practices embedded in the structure of PPPs (e.g., Davies, 2005; Skelcher et al., 2005). Deviating from such previous studies, we placed more emphasis on interactions between institutions (e.g. scheme or framework of projects) and actors (e.g., organizations) to achieve a more dynamic perspective. In such interactions, one frame is formed and shared among actors, and then they carry out collaborative practices on the basis of the institution in which this frame is based. This research attempts to adopt discussions derived from both institutional- and social-movement theory.

In the recent decade, institutional theorists have struggled to construct the logic-matrix needed to explain the dynamic process of institutional change (e.g., Seo & Creed, 2002). Many of them argue against a structural perspective of organizational conformity to legitimized institutions in an organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and place their emphasis on the positive aspect of actors working on institutions while being embedded in those very institutions. Davis et al. (2005) assert the significance of adopting social movement theory to comprehend dynamic processes driven by both organizational and institutional transformation. With use of frame analysis, we endeavor to explain the qualitative change of a multi-sector partnership that co-evolved both the actors and institutions involved.

Frame analysis was introduced by scholars in the field of social movement theory (e.g., Snow, et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988). This analysis is affected by social constructionism (Gergen, 1994), and assumes collective identity of participants in social movement. Snow, et al. (1986) borrow the term ‘frame’ from Goffman (1974, p.21) to denote ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enables individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large (Snow, et al., 1986, p. 464). They use the verb ‘framing’ to conceptualize signifying works that render events or occurrences meaningful in processes of mobilization for social movements. This ‘framing’ functions to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. The outcome of framing depends on ‘frame alignment’ (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198); that is, the linkage of individual and Social Movement Organization (SMO) interpretive orientations, in the sense that some set of individual interests, values, and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideologies are congruent and complementary. Commitment to social movements among participants depends on the degree of discontent against social issues and the path of accumulating such discontent. In a sense, difference in the cognitive sources on social movement affects the effectiveness of mobilization.

Our case analysis focuses on the formation and reformation processes of the frame underlying the PPP for disaster recovery. We employ a sociological approach - such as discourse analysis - as the
method to analyze this process, and put more emphasis on the cognitive aspects of key actors engaged in implementing the PPP. The interviews with key actors were conducted for the collection of qualitative data. Based on this, we attempt to elucidate 1) who projected a frame for disaster recovery to whom, 2) how this frame was accepted and how it reflected on both public policy and the PPP implementing this public policy for disaster recovery; and 3) how both public policy and the PPP were institutionalized, and co-evolved with organizations undertaking the PPP, while the frame was achieving legitimacy. Finally, we attempt to illustrate a qualitative change in the PPP by revealing how the new frame rose and became the predominant one. In short, this research reviews a case of the PPP between Local Infrastructure Organizations (LIOs) managed by Non-profit organizations (NPOs), and the Hyogo prefectural government. The case analysis investigates the process in which the predominant PPP frame changed from Community Business (CB) to Social Enterprise (SE), which led to several qualitative changes in the partnership.

CASE ANALYSIS

The case analysis is roughly divided into five phases. The first phase concerns the framing process of the driving concept of CB which underlies the partnership. We investigate how key persons formed a collective identity, and then reflected this identity on both the partnership frame of CB, and the partnership scheme to empower residents in devastated areas. Second, we look into a co-evolutionary process between LIOs and this partnership scheme. During this phase, the number of support centers managed by LIOs increased from one to six sites, while each LIO made progress in supporting the foundation of NPOs and expanding consultations with citizens who seek ‘zest for life’. Public officials strived to improve the presence of this partnership scheme in the public sector, and showed the achievements of the PPP to the Governor of the Hyogo prefectural government. These attempts met with success, which led to a rapid increase in the budget of the PPP. This resulted in the expansion of target areas from inside the initial disaster area to other areas beyond this zone.

About 10 years after its start, the PPP went into the third phase. In this phase, the institutionalization of the partnerships backed by the CB frame underwent formalization due to the institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001) among LIOs. On the other hand, key actors gradually came to realize that the partnership had become less consistent with social needs. Finally, the initial frame of CB (based on giving ‘zest for life’) became less legitimate on the one hand, while a new frame of SE with aim to resolve social issues through social business became more legitimate on the other hand (the fourth phase). In the last phase, the predominant frame eventually changed from CB to SE. This brought about a qualitative institutional change. The following sections illustrate all the phases stated above in detail with use of both social movement and organizational theory.

Formation of the CB frame

This section explains the process of forming shared recognition of the CB frame among key persons across the public-private boundary. Framing of the CB frame was attempted by a researcher who is an influential policy staff member for the prefectural government. This frame was accepted, and formalized by both prefectural staff and leaders of LIOs. The prefectural government formally defined CB as a community-based small business for expanding growth for the benefit of the community (Katoh, 2004, p. 80) and then this definition was amplified by practitioners. CB was considered to be a driving force to promote Community Empowerment, with a view of helping support victim citizens to be independent by operating businesses for disaster recovery on the basis of the mutual-benefit for each community. This frame reflects on community empowerment policy which intends to promote ‘independence and interdependency of disaster-affected people’. This policy was designed to help victim citizens to obtain ‘zest for life’ through CB as well as to promote disaster recovery through CB.

Formation of the CB frame was backed by several elements. The formation of the CB frame was composed of several elements interacting with one another. The first element is an emergent situation caused by an exceptional natural disaster, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, which made it possible
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The serious damages of communities in devastated areas prompted central government and local governments in the disaster areas (the Hyogo prefectural government and the Kobe municipal government) to seek measures for promoting community empowerment in the mid-to-long term as well as to provide initial emergency support to the communities.

Just after the great earthquake, the Japanese central government installed a head office for disaster recovery, and then established a special fund for disaster recovery in cooperation with the local governments. In addition, the central government announced a plan for legal arrangements to support volunteer groups or voluntary organizations in terms of granting corporate status5), since it recognized the significant role of those groups or organizations in undertaking relief activities for disaster victims. The central government took the lead in disaster area recovery. Therefore, local governments were compelled to follow the employment policy formulated by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. This made it difficult for these local governments to promote their own recovery policies.

However, in parallel with implementing a recovery policy made by the central government, the prefectural government was in search for community-based support. Under such circumstances, Prof. Yoshimasa Katoh (University of Hyogo: prefectural university) played an important role in framing CB towards policy makers of the prefectural government. The concept of CB proposed by Katoh just before the earthquake came to draw a lot of attention in the prefectural government. In 1993 at the meeting of the Council for Quality of Life of the Residents held by the Hyogo prefectural government, Katoh proposed CB as a key concept to improve quality of life. He stayed in Sheffield for his sabbatical in 1990 in order to investigate UK regeneration policies through Enterprise Zones and the Urban Development Corporation. With a review of the outcome brought about by such top-down based community regeneration policies, CB was paid more attention as a community-led policy to encourage regional independency.

In response to Prof. Katoh’s framing, prefectural policy makers of the prefectural government hammered out a drastic policy for employment promotion with more flexible use of available funds (Hanshin Awaji Reconstruction Fund). The municipal support policy for CB was implemented in 1996. This policy started with competitive bidding among volunteer groups or voluntary organizations to win a grant of 3 million yen for each proposed business plan. This policy was later succeeded by the Support Project for Promoting CB in the Disaster Areas (SPPCB) that was the PPP between the prefectural government and NPOs.

The SPPCB was created in accordance with the Program for Emergency Employment Development announced by the central government as a succession of economic policy packages. This occurred under a radical recession, which was caused by an Asia-wide financial crisis in the autumn of 1997 and which led to a massive rise in the unemployment rate. This crisis, in particular, severely affected the devastated areas6). The SPPCB was promoted by the prefectural government with the use of reconstruction funds since it was not granted approval to use the main budget due to a budgetary assessment. A significant point of the SPPCD is to employ a presentation-based competition to select contractors to operate the ISC. It was an unprecedented selection method. The SPPCB was initiated as a time-limited experimental program, which was essentially a revolutionary concept as the existing prefectural policy framework was based on precedent principle.

In the process of developing and formalizing the CB frame, another key-person of the prefectural government, Keiko Kiyohara of a division for reconstruction support, had a significant role. She had a deep understanding of CB as a driving force to stimulate and energize victim citizens. Kiyohara encouraged leaders of local volunteer groups to promote relief activities, some of whom became leaders of NPOs managing LIOs, and as such had many discussions with them in the areas of disaster recovery. She gradually came to realize the needs of CB while she met volunteer leaders, and then dedicated herself to back-up the promotion of CB with her strong consciousness regarding the independency of victim citizens.

The second element of forming the CB frame was that the great earthquake gave the momentum
for the Japanese voluntary sector to emerge and develop. The Sasakawa Foundation (at present: Japan Foundation) group, which was one of the most major independent granting foundations, instituted a time-limited special fund intended for recovery-support activities. The director of this foundation intensively offered grants for organizations engaging in prospective community and community support activities rather than those for immediate frontline support activities for disaster victims. With receipt of such funds, Community Support Center Kobe (CS Kobe), which is one of the most prominent LIOs in Kobe, went into full-swing in 1996. CS Kobe aimed to support the incubation and operation of CB as well as the foundation of NPOs with a mission of ‘Independency and Interdependency’ for the recovery of devastated communities. In disaster areas, those who lost their own housing, job, and family had almost lost their ‘zest for life’. In fact, many of those who lived in shelters (temporary housings) ended their lives in suicide. Merely receiving relief supplies could not summon much enthusiasm to live from disaster victims. CB was designed to encourage disaster-struck people to help each other by self-delivering goods and services to those who needed them, which helped them regain their ‘zest for life’.

The support model based on CB gradually came to be recognized as an effective one to empower devastated communities among key people (in particular, Kiyohara, Nakamura, and Mori).

Co-evolution of the community empowerment policy and LIOs through the PPP

In implementing the community empowerment policy, the LIOs developed through interactions with one another. They were intended to back up NPOs engaging in the provision of front-line services. In the Kobe area (one of the most devastated areas) the great earthquake added momentum to create voluntary intermediary activities for the recovery of the devastated areas. Those activities
evolved through the public funds and public policies designed for the recovery of damaged areas. In the year 2000, as part of the SPPCD, the Ikigai ('zest for life' in Japanese) Support Center (ISC) was founded to support those who intend to start CB. Since the fiscal 2001, this support project extended beyond the disaster areas to the whole Hyogo prefecture region. The role of this project is to support activists who are oriented to create worthwhile jobs as well as to support jobseekers. In a sense, this center supports the start-up for the business (e.g., consultations for incubation, employment referral, seminars and internship placements). The publicly-built and privately-operated approach – that is to say, the prefectural government builds and then the LIOs operate – was adopted. First, it was judged that independent organizations were able to operate this project more effectively than public organizations. Second, the prefectural government aimed at making financial foundation of the LIO more stable. In year of 2000, CS Kobe was entrusted to operate the ISC through a competitive bidding as the first trustee LIO. In 2002, the Takarazuka NPO center headed by Mori also became a trustee of the ISC. The revenue from the operation of the ISC project has been a main financial source for both LIOs since then.

The new endeavor of the ISC project was conducted by the prefectural government, and a framework of the ISC project was constructed in collaboration with CS Kobe (Nakamura). The prefectural government gave weight to the information offered by CS Kobe which engaged in supporting CB as well as foundation of NPOs. There were several reasons for the prefectural government to entrust this “first-of-its-kind” project to CS Kobe, which are as follows. First, other NPOs had not developed enough by that point in time to undertake such a project. Additionally, the effectiveness of LIO was unknown. And finally, CS Kobe sought to undertake the ISC project as its primary one since this project related strongly to its own mission.

The prefectural government and CS Kobe had great success in the ISC project. Many clients visited CS Kobe, and many of them were incorporated with legal status with the support of CS Kobe. Under the trend of NPO movement after the enactment of an NPO law of 1998, CS Kobe became famous for blazing a trail for LIOs across the whole nation. Following the success of the ISC project, the prefectural government gradually increased ISC support, and currently there are 6 operational ISCs. The operating scheme drawn by CS Kobe was adopted by all the other latecomer centers. The discussions of the liaison committee among ISCs were headed by Nakamura and Mori. Finally, 6 centers were founded inside and outside of the devastated areas. Each center came to be operated by a local LIO in each area. The purpose of the ISC project was transformed from disaster recovery to community empowerment after ISC project expanded beyond the devastated areas.

**Institutionalization of the ISC project**

The framework of the ISC project was constructed by the prefectural government in collaboration with CS Kobe. The rest of the other 5 ISCs conformed themselves to this successful framework in a process of institutional isomorphism. Key-persons with a strong sense of mission to recover from such a rare natural disaster existed on both sides of the prefectural government and LIOs. The network consisting of those people strongly influenced such a framework. In the prefectural government, Kiyohara, who adhered to ‘zest for life’, facilitated the ISC project. On the LIO side, Nakamura and Mori took the lead in discussions on the direction and operation of the ISC at the ISC liaison meeting. In addition, Kiyohara endeavored to find opportunities to show the achievements of the ISC project to the governor of Hyogo prefecture, and to make chances for Nakamura and Mori to get in touch with the governor. In 2006, the budget of the ISC project was completely transferred from the reconstruction fund to a general account budget of the prefectural government. In this manner, the CB frame was strengthened in a process of a deepening bond among key-persons, which resulted in prominent existence of the ISC.

However, on the other hand, the institutionalization of the CB frame came to lose its substance. In a sense, the framework of the first ISC became a standard operating procedure, since no public official had enough knowledge and adherence to build up the framework of the ISC because of repeated
personnel changes every fiscal year. Due to these circumstances, the following points should be noted. First, the prefectural government itself not only initiated ISC project as a ‘first-ever’ one, but also constructed methods for the operation and evaluation of those centers. The second point is that the first ISC was recognized as a successful case. By taking leadership of the LIO liaison committee, Nakamura and Mori reinforced such standardization stream. Hence, the performance demonstrated by each of the 6 centers is currently evaluated by the number of start-ups (establishment of NPO) and consultations with those who seek employment referral.

The more operation methods and evaluating procedures were standardized, the more inflexible they became in accordance with conditional changes of the devastated areas. However, such inflexibilities did not draw attention from actors to reform the partnership frame, as the CB frame was diffused and strengthened among LIOs undertaking operation of the ISC project. Two things are considered to be its background causes. This first one is that the institutionalization of the ISC project was justified by the successful reputation of the first ISC. The second one is that the influential key persons who constructed the CB frame were able to exert their influence on the operation of the ISC project, since many of the public officials in charge of this project were in shortage of both information and skills to evaluate this project because of frequent personnel changes.

Declination of the CB frame

The institutionalization of the ISC exposed contradictions in working fields of newly established ISCs. Contrary to the first center, those centers were installed in undamaged areas. The clients who visited were in search of job-positions rather than the establishment of CB and NPOs. Unlike the devastated areas, those areas faced problems concerning a decrease in population and industrial decline rather than disaster recovery. These contexts made a great difference to the operation of the new ISCs from the first center in the devastated area. In other words, even if the operating environments of the ISCs varied among regions, the original framework built in Kobe was directly disseminated into other areas. This resulted in the rise of sharp institutional contradictions. These contradictions were mainly experienced by the ISCs located outside of the devastated areas. Above all, the needs for disaster recovery had been already met, as more than one and half decades had passed since the occurrence of the great earthquake. A large number of NPOs were established during this period. Under these circumstances, more people came to visit the ISCs because they failed to get job positions at normal job centers. Those people were different from those who were expected by the CB frame. Following this trend, questions of the methods for operation and evaluation gradually arose.

Under this situation in which the mission of disaster recovery was almost cleared, and a large number of voluntary organizations were incorporated with NPO status, some LIOs threw doubt on the evaluation based on the number of NPOs established. It came to be highly visible that some NPOs were established to take advantage of the NPO boom, and then got disbanded or went dormant due to difficulties in their management. Therefore, some latecomer LIOs came to cast doubt on the necessity of legal status. However, great energy was still needed to transform such a situation while the institutionalization was yet developing. Nakamura also felt the necessity to make some revisions to the ISC project. Things were complicated because some LIOs, in particular CS and Takarazuka, had been dependent on the revenue from the ISC project since its commencement.

Rise of new frame and fall of old frame

Due to the institutionalization, the ISC project based on the CB frame had continued with no great transformation since its start, even if contradictions came to be visible. However, a new frame came to rise. The generation change of LIO staff is considered to have triggered the rise of the new frame. One case is the rise of a new generation inside the LIOs whose founders experienced the great earthquake. The other case is that of newly established LIOs whose mission was different from the existing LIOs. This young generation tended to place more emphasis on SE rather than CB. Social enterprise is placed in between purely philanthropic and purely commercial activities in terms of motives, methods,
goals and stakeholders including beneficiaries, capital, workforces, and suppliers (Dees, 1998, p.60). Fostering and support of entrepreneurs attracted a great deal of attention as a method to achieve a purpose of renovating regional communities devastated by influence of globalization, change of industrial structure, and demographic movement through new business. In the prefectural government, a change in the direction of community empowerment was reviewed.

The concept of SE came out of the prefectural government, itself having urgent issues to address regional renovation and creation of employment in rural communities devastated by a problem of depopulation in the north and middle part of Hyogo prefecture. In addressing these issues, more expectations were placed on social business including tourist and agricultural businesses. Social businesses managed by SE were expected to resolve social issues, and drew attention from the prefectural government. Framing projected by the prefectural government was accepted by mainly latecomer LIOs. Sharaku, one of the latecomer LIOs, started their own business with an emphasis on SE, and initiated business support for social entrepreneurs in the north and middle part of Hyogo together with the prefectural government (specifically, the Division for Promotion of Collaboration with NPOs). In addition, Seeds Kakogawa, the other latecomer LIO, not only cast doubt on the existing ISC framework based on the CB frame, but also exited from the ISC in 2012. Those LIOs were keen on the betterment of NPO management, and currently seek to find a way out from high financial dependence on PPPs. The key for those issues is to arrange financial infrastructure for NPOs or local voluntary organizations to create social business. In 2013 those latecomer LIOs supported the foundation of the Hyogo Community Fund (a Civic Fund) with the intention of fostering NPOs as Social Enterprises. This civic fund is expected to provide flexible financial support for social enterprises or NPOs operating social business.

On the other hand, the CB frame side lost momentum in the following ways. Kiyohara retired from the prefectural government in 2012. Mori, who took the lead of ISC liaison committee with Nakamura, passed away in 2011. Nakamura became less influential among LIO leaders. In the prefectural government, serious distortion within divisions concerning community empowerment policy brought about a serious problem. At the commencement of ISC project, the purpose mainly consists of fostering the NPOs for operation of CB, and matching those who seek for ‘zest for life’ with such NPOs. In implementing this project, the prefectural government Division for Employment Promotion - that is in charge of ISC project - and the Division for Promotion of Collaboration with NPOs - that is in charge of NPO support - were...
consistent in their direction and drive for disaster recovery. However, since more than 15 years have passed, the orientation of community empowerment policy has turned gradually into community renovation through social enterprise or business. The officer of the Division for Promotion of Collaboration with NPOs recognized a change in policy orientation from CB to SE. This division support the civic fund stated above. As for financial matters, the budget allocated to the ISC project was cut by 30% in line with administrative reform in 2008. It became clear that even if the ISC is continued, the CS frame is no longer predominant. Reframing projected by one division of the prefectural government was accepted by latecomer LIOs, which led to the formation of the SE frame. The SE frame affected the ISC project, and became the predominant one among LIOs.

CONCLUSION

Our research shows a qualitative change in the PPP brought about by a frame formation and reformation through interactions between the prefectural government and LIOs with use of frame analysis. LIO actions and prefectural policy driven by the PPP were introduced based on the ideals and sense-of-mission of each organization. It was indispensible to form a frame because it was highly difficult to select a rational course of action under an unstable and hitherto un-experienced situation. Frame functions as a bridge between one guiding in basic direction and the other introducing more feasible policy and strategy. In a sense, a frame exists, as middle-range reliance on selecting a proper direction, between norms such as mission, ideal and legitimacy, and circumstantial judgments concerning resources and feasibility. Furthermore, this research confirms that an existing frame can be reformed or replaced with a new frame in order to adapt institutions for the social environment after actors came to recognize incompatibility between said institution and the social environment. Frame analysis provides a new analytical perspective to grasp a qualitative change of the partnership.

NOTES

1) An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 34th EGPA Annual Conference in Bergen, Norway, 5-8 September 2012.
2) Public Private Partnership is to combine the resources of government with those of private agents (businesses or not-for-profit bodies) in order to deliver societal goals. In delivering those goals, PPP takes various forms such as the contracting-out of public services, management of public utilities, the design of hybrid organizations for risk sharing and co-production between government and private agents (Skelcher, 2005, p. 347).
3) Institutions are composed of cultured-cognitive, normative and regulative elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life. Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts (Scott, 2001, p.48).
4) The term ‘Local Infrastructure Organizations (LIOs)’ originally comes from the UK voluntary sector. LIOs take many shapes and forms but they generally exist to serve a common purpose - to ensure that local third sector organizations get the advice, support and representation they need to improve the circumstances of the people and communities they work with (Wells & Dayson, 2010, p.1).
5) In 1998, three years after the occurrence of the great earthquake, this plan was realized in the form of the enactment of the “Act on Promotion of Specified Non-profit Activities” that is called NPO law in the Diet.
6) In April of 1999, the ratio of job offers to job applicants in Hyogo prefecture decreased to the rate of 0.33. Although it’s uncertain whether this rate resulted from fully satiated demand for employment creation in the disaster areas, or nationwide recession, it is certain that this prompted the prefectural government to formulate and develop the plan for employment promotion through expansion of CB managed by NPOs (Shimozaki, 2005, p. 275).
7) CS Kobe originally described its own activities as being those of a volunteer group, the
Higashinada Mutual Support Network (Community Support Center Kobe, 2003). This group emerged out of citizens’ voluntary efforts to help disaster victims. In October 1996, about a year and a half after the great earthquake, Junko Nakamura founded CS Kobe in the form of a ‘spin-off’ of this group. She launched community support activities with an organizational mission of ‘independence and interdependence’. This principle aims to enable those with support to help others. CS Kobe has supported and prepared NPOs rather than helped individual disaster victims. CS Kobe has conducted various kinds of support activities in the disaster areas since its foundation.

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